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Devoted to the Science of Religion,
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FOUNDED BY EDWARD C. HEGELER

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Volume XLIV (No. 12) DECEMBER, 1930 Number 895

VIRGIL

Publius Vergilius Maro, 70-19 B. C.

BY ELIZABETH CARUS

THIS year marks the two thousandth anniversary of the birth of Virgil and it is being noted by exhibitions and commentaries on his accomplishments and his influence through these twenty centuries. He gave to Italy, then devastated by civil war, bankrupt and depopulated, the spiritual force and the creative impulse which made it possible for her to establish herself as a unified whole, and it is his interpretation of it which has become a part of our world thought. Augustus was the founder of the political ideal of the Holy Roman Empire; Virgil, the poet of Italy, was the inspired authority thereof who kept alive the nobler conception of sovereignty.

Virgil is famous for three main volumes of poetry, the Eclogues, a group of pastoral poems, the Georgics, which praise the simple life and labor, and the Aeneid, an epic of the Roman nation.

Virgil was born in 70 B. C. near Mantua. At the time of his birth Italy was absorbed by the struggle for supremacy between Rome and the provinces. He received a very thorough education first at Cremona and the University of Milan, later at Rome. We know little of the following years except that his travels must have brought him over all Italy for in his poems he shows an intimate knowledge of the country from the Alps to the straits. (Virgil was living in the country). In 42 B. C. when the general confiscation of land took place, Virgil was living in the country, and in the Eclogues he gives a vivid account of the confiscation of

his father's farm. Later through influential friends the farm was restored.


The Eclogues, begun in the country, were finished at Rome. For some time before their publication Virgil was one of a group of close friends who had in common a vision of new possibilities and a new meaning for poetry. The poetry then in vogue was of the stilted, scholastic Alexandrian school which could not develop any further. This group, which included the poets, Gallus, Varius, and Macer, produced a large amount of poetry. With the appearance of the Eclogues, Virgil became the leader of the movement, now known as Virgilism. His fame and influence were immediate. The new poetry in Greek literary forms, with simple musical rhythms, was not perfect in workmanship, but it was free and it was alive. In the Eclogues, as in all the writings of Virgil, there is a mystic and a prophetic note foretelling a Golden Age about to be realized. He is under the spell of the greatness of Rome, yet he is Italian in spirit and has that great quality of expressing the yearning of the soul in its deeper moods.

The promises of the Eclogues are treated as actual facts in the Georgics, which were inspired by his friend Maecenas. In those days the influence of a poet in moulding public opinion was very great. Italy was economically exhausted and needed men to develop her unused wealth which lay idle in virgin soil, forest and swamp. Virgil sought to awaken a new interest in the land with the little touches of genius which make poetry of everyday tasks, he transfigured the simple hard life of the farmer and idealized agriculture and industry, making the Georgics the most perfect poems of native Italian life.

Shortly before the Georgics were finished Octavius was made supreme and the unification of Italy was complete. To celebrate this event Virgil started the Aeneid which became the complete expression of his profound thought and his philosophy of life, his dreams and his ideals. After eleven years, in 19 B. C. the epic was finished, and in order to perfect it Virgil visited Greece. He had planned to stay three years, but he met Augustus in Athens, and returned with him the same year. At Megara, where they stopped on the voyage, Virgil was taken sick. They hurried home. Virgil died a few days after reaching Brundisium and was buried at Naples, where his tomb was, for a long time, held in religious veneration.

GIOVANNI FABRINI DA FIGHINE.

Sopra il Quinto Libro de l'Eneide di Virgilio.



INTEEA mediū Aeneas, &c.] Mentre che Dido ne li sepellua, & li piagnua; Enea cia già nel mezzo del mare per andare in Italia. Et voltandoli indietro, vidde che turta Cartagine in splendua di fiamme di fuoco, e non sapeua la cagione.

Esposizione de le parole, de le favole, de l'istorie, e luoghi grammaticali.

Con questo principio di Libro Virgilio accozza secon lo la sua vianza il quarto libro, la maggior parte del qual egli ha tolto di Homero. Perche tutte le cose che egli racconta

INTEEA mediūm Aeneas non esse tenebat
Certeus itor: studiūq; at eos agatione secebat,
Mentia respiciens, que carnis in se habet
Collucet flammis, que tantum accenderit ignem
Causa letet: a duri magno sed mare de iaces
Politū, totūq; furens quos furore pulsū,
I rīde per augurium Teucrorum pectora dicitur.

noi diciamo, che egli natigò intorno al primo nascimento del giorno. E però il dille,

*Non est specula, si primū albescere lucem,
Vultus equarū classē procedit re vela.*

Altri non tutto quel giorno che Dido se ammazzò, e si
trattò, fece poco progresso in mare, tirando a uno
e intor-

By the command of Augustus, Virgil's request to have the *Aeneid* destroyed was overruled. Instead Virgil was given divine honors and the *Aeneid* was regarded as an inspired writing to be consulted for omens of the future of the empire and its rulers.


The dominant idea of the *Aeneid* is that of an universal empire founded by divine decree, and glorifying not only Rome, but all of Italy. Virgil tried to fuse into a homogeneous whole a Latin *Iliad*, an annalistic epic of the nation, and the celebration of the struggles and triumphs of his own age. This task was one of supreme difficulty and many times in periods of depression he thought it hopeless. He wanted to make his epic a guiding force to the whole Latin world.

The main part of the story describes the founding and establishing of Rome by Aeneas, the highest point of which is reached when he sails up the Tiber and lands on the spot which is to become Rome. To this theme Virgil adds the seven years of wandering from Troy and the love story of Dido and Aeneas, which became one of such enthralling interest that it almost absorbed the whole action of the poem, but Virgil's transcendental vision draws the two themes together and unifies them. Aeneas is taken into the underworld and undergoes an experience similar to conversion. One sees in a fourth dimensional view the past and the future side by side where one senses the ultimate secret of the universe and its creative processes. The picture is one of haunting impressions and of the eternal search into the unknown.

The greatest criticism of the poem has been concerning the pious character of Aeneas, who is not human in that he never thinks of his own desires or gains; to Virgil, however, he was a religious ideal, guided by a higher power, the founder of the empire and the idea of divine sovereignty.

Virgil tried to include all the knowledge and riches of the world in the *Aeneid*. To the simple Homeric structure he added the refinements of later Greek poetry, the high ornamentation of Alexandrian verse, and the new romantic motives which made him the source of romanticism for later ages. We are just now beginning to appreciate the poem as a treasury of Italian antiques, for it records the geography and ethnography of ancient Italy, the religious practices, the social life and civic institutions of the time.

Except for the glorification of Augustus, Virgil kept clear of



A MAP SHOWING THE WANDERINGS OF AENEAS

partisan passions, and he could thus idealize the monarchy sincerely. He was the voice of Rome and the interpreter of its part in the history of the world. From this time the state was bound up with the sanctions of religion, as is shown by the title Augustus, which means the venerable with both a political and a religious significance. Throughout the empire the idea of a universal religion was developing, one main feature of which was that a Saviour would come who would establish peace on earth and a kingdom of righteousness. In the fourth Eclogue Virgil prophesies the birth of a child who would fulfill these expectations. Because of these Christian sentiments, even though they were expressed entirely in pagan terms, and because they expressed the very foundations upon which Christianity was based, the church recognized Virgil, and believed him to be inspired by God.

The Aeneid was never forgotten as were the classics of Greece. It was read and memorized and made the basis of education. It was the lay bible of the middle ages, the inspiration of poets. Virgil, himself was called *The Poet*. His name became a tradition to which were ascribed the qualities of a magician, and which had nothing in common with the original character of the poet. This legendary Virgil is said to have built a castle from which the emperor could see and hear all that was done and said in Rome; he made a lamp which lighted the whole city, and many other marvelous things. The same kind of stories, often the same ones, are ascribed to Aristotle and other ancient celebrities. The fact that he became the center of these legends shows how widespread was his fame and his influence.

After Virgil's death an endless literature began to grow up about him, and it still continues to grow. The first good commentary on his work was produced in Syria and the best portrait preserved of him is in fine mosaic, found at Tunis near the site of the ancient city of Carthage where Aeneas had been seen a thousand years earlier.

The following tabulation of the number of editions of his works and the languages in which they are printed is given by the Union Catalogue in the Library of Congress.

EDITIONS OF VIRGIL IN THE UNITED STATES

A recent survey of the Virgil material in the United States carried on by Project "B," Library of Congress, sheds much light on the prevalence of this favorite classic in American libraries. It is a surprising fact that upon a single appeal made by the Chairman of the Bimillennium Committee, 98 libraries responded to the call and supplied data for their holdings. The request for material was limited to editions other than school texts, and to a certain date, so that it may be assumed that the figures quoted represent minimums rather than maximums.

The tabulation attached hereto shows in detail the distribution of the editions of Virgil and discloses the fact that the student by means of Union Catalogs of the Library of Congress, is enabled to locate copies of Virgil proper, either complete works or individual parts, within the territory of the United States, exclusive of all works about Virgil. •

Of these 2145 represent individual editions (entries in Union Catalogs) which again are supplemented by additional 1554 locations, so that about every other edition listed in Union Catalogs is represented in two or more libraries.

Neither the works relating to Virgil, the travesties, nor the legends, are included in this tabulation. These, in themselves, form an additional catalog of no mean size.

Nor does the scholar of a foreign country, wishing to pursue studies in his own language, have to forego this privilege, since the survey shows that almost all of the principal languages are well represented in the Union Catalog as follows:

Polyglot	4	Gascon	2	Norwegian	1
Catalan	1	Greek	10	Portuguese	16
Danish	4	Hebrew	1	Scotch	3
Dutch	12	Hungarian	1	Spanish	37
Esperanto	2	Irish	1	Swedish	6
Gaelic	1	Italian	137	Russian	3

EDITIONS OF VIRGIL IN THE UNITED STATES

Vergilius Maro, Publius,	Total editions	In more than one library.
Latin texts:		
Works	846	692
Aeneid	179	103
Bucolics & Georgics	54	40
Bucolics	81	34
Georgics	80	56
Total (except *)	1,240	925
*Minor works	44	48
English texts:		
Works	164	156
Aeneid	219	230
Bucolics & Georgics	17	13
Bucolics	52	20
Georgics	35	56
Total	487	475
French texts	105	23
German texts	85	21
All other languages	184	62
Total	2,145	1,554

ETHICS AND REALITY

BY T. SWANN HARDING

THE field of ethics and morals seems very chaotic to one trained in science. In spite of the fact that systems of ethics are many and varied it is a peculiar fact that the majority of people the wide world over are quite well agreed as to the good in certain acts and the bad in certain others. Moreover this agreement has existed for some centuries. This suggests at once that there are rules at work in the sphere of ethics and morals quite as surely as in that of physics, and that they are probably as true on the average, or statistically, as the rules governing the actions of atoms and molecules. It also suggests that there could be formulated a system of ethics as "true" for its specific reality as systems of physics are for their particular reality. Quite probably several such pragmatically "true" systems could be formulated, each quite useful, and dozens of quite useless fictional systems could be altogether eliminated.

In America we are especially interested in crime. We speak proudly of our crime waves and we have a crime commission to investigate them. Their existence is very real and yet our method of dealing with them is still, in many instances, very primitive. This becomes apparent in *In Prison* by Kate O'Hare, a book no one should read who cherishes fictions more than hypotheses dealing with reality. Oddly enough, it describes as still existing in American prisons abuses which the Webbs (in their *English Prisons Under Local Government*) considered atrocious in English prisons of the seventeenth century. I refer particularly to the attendants' habits of mulcting and defrauding prisoners of money and sustenance illegally. It is also still possible for a person to be convicted of some infraction of social custom—for social custom interprets law and reading the Constitution or the Bible in public may or may not be illegal, depending upon momentary social customs—and ultimately sent to prison. Here this person may actually be the victim of anti-social acts much worse than those which brought about in-

carceration and may also be compelled to break certain laws more fundamental than those whose infraction brought about imprisonment. Very curious isn't it?

For instance contract labor may be prohibited in the prisons of a certain state. That state and others may also have laws saying that all prison-made goods must be clearly labeled as such. The prisoner may, however, be so farmed out to an overall manufacturer in a distant state that he or she gets fifty cents to a dollar a month for work worth \$5 a day and the profits go not to the federal government nor to the state, but to the contractor. Furthermore he or she may be compelled to sew labels into finished garments which insist they were produced at the factories of industrialists several hundred miles away; these prison products are then sold as privately manufactured, and quite illegally. Finally, the prisoner may be beaten or assaulted; he may be, and often is, exposed carelessly to infection by the most awful diseases, and he leaves the institution, willy nilly, a complete adept at all forms of criminal technic whether he has learned anything else or not.

The National Crime Commission has, in its preliminary reports, observed that such prison abuses still exist in the United States on a very considerable scale. But, if we wished, we might consider a step still earlier in the process—that of "responsibility" which is a word that covers a fiction. For we condemn and punish if the person committing an anti-social act was "responsible" for his action whereas, in reality, responsibility is itself established empirically in each case and, from a scientific standpoint, means exactly nothing. For there are only three kinds of criminals: 1. The chronically and incurably mischievous who should be intelligently re-restrained for the rest of their natural lives; 2. the psychic and glandular types, or those with other physiological lesions, who can be cured by medical therapy and released as entirely new characters; 3. the normals who, under great stress, make an isolated detour into crime, who should be compelled to make civil restitution and discharged in care of their "conscience," (for they have a something that gives them the very devil the rest of their lives) after it has been determined medically and psychologically that they are perfectly normal.

That in itself is all very interesting. The present fiction is that the person performed an anti-social act. He must be punished; he must make retribution to society, in order to deter others, or he must at least be reformed. The fact is that in many prisons he is mis-

treated, nothing is done to change his social habits for the better, he is exposed to infection, compelled to break other laws more fundamental than those he broke outside prison, and sent forth bitter and psychopathic. Higher prison officials are still frequently appointed as political favors; lower officials are underpaid and unintelligent; all are very often entirely untrained. We are not by innate nature maliciously savage people. Just why do we do such things as have been described? Just why do we persist in believing in fictions so manifest when facts are so easily ascertainable? I rather think we have something to learn from quite non-criminal people in their ordinary, everyday habits of conduct, and I want to adduce three examples, which may seem trivial, but which may also yield considerable information upon examination and analysis.

The other morning a woman burst in upon me quite radiant because her daughter had won a rifle contest in college; she was with the winning team and she also made a high record personally. The mother's enthusiasm seemed to me at first exceedingly pernicious, later only somewhat silly. My first feeling was to become indignant and sermonize—i.e. to assume the inherent inerrancy of my views, arrived at after long and devious study, and their supreme right to triumph over hers when expressed emotionally. For the shooting of guns and marksmanship have to me many connotations of value which they do not have to the superficial and quite innocently and ignorantly frivolous woman who asked me to share her enthusiasm.

The essential utility of guns is to kill. They may be used to kill birds or animals, but few of us need them for that purpose. The only widespread need we could ever have would be for the killing of human beings. This brings up the specter of war, or of police violence, and the possibility that complete familiarity with firearms will very probably develop in anyone a psychological state quite less inimical to bloodshed than that of a person like myself who never touched a firearm, if I remember correctly. In short the values evolved by long and arduous study arose in me. But there was no time to explain all of that. It would have taken me several hours even had the woman been disposed to listen. She would then have been unable to understand because she had not been accustomed to think; she took current fictions at face value. For me to become emotionally disdainful and arrogantly seek to enforce my views would have been useless. What I actually did was make some very silly remark to the effect that young women were apparently trained

in college these days to make them capable of dealing effectively with their husbands somewhat later.

A second instance: Two gentlemen sat behind me on the street-car this morning talking of a third man whose name should, I suppose, be Chaos. They were discussing what they called "efficiency" and "system" and it became quite apparent that Chaos was one of these helter-skelter persons who had no place for anything and everything was somewhere else. They agreed on that. But they did not get much further. For within five minutes it developed that one of them, A, was himself far more precise than the other, B. When A began to tell exactly how he did things B soon began interrupting to show where this or that practice was not systematic, was not efficient, but was actually a fettering bad habit. The argument rapidly became passionate and it ended with A's departure from the car. Nothing at all had been accomplished except a display of bad temper.

By third instance concerns a married couple who sat across from me recently in a shoe store. The woman was buying two pairs of shoes. The man quite apparently had no objection to that. In fact I knew him quite well and I knew his wife. He was the kind of man who thought of things literary first and everything else thereafter. She was the kind of woman who would think of shoes or a dress first and might think of things intellectual secondly. Quite suddenly he remembered something and withdrew from his briefcase a magazine containing an article of his which had just appeared so illustrated as greatly to please him. Intoxicated with his interest and anxious to show the illustrations to her he burst in, at a moment the shoe salesman had turned aside, and brought the article to her attention.

The result was explosive. She became very indignant and in tones quite audible to me some ten feet away told him that he was ridiculously ignorant and rude and would never learn any manners. She was interested in shoes and interviewing a salesman whereupon he, like a child, rudely interrupted. The salesman meantime had turned to the couple and viewed the spectacle with astonishment. The husband, however, laughed, shrugged his shoulders as one would to some irritable child, put the article away and assumed a gentlemanly interest in shoes again. A moment later, entirely due to his adroit handling of the situation, the woman was quite herself and they were rather merrily discussing shoes. Here we have a

miniature study of an element which could completely disrupt a marriage except for the fact that the husband, and I happen in this instance to know both parties to the conversation very well, has his emotions so well disciplined that he does not allow them to go out on parade on matters of no particular intellectual consequence.

Reviewing these trivial instances more abstractly what do we find? First they are important because they and millions like them, are part and parcel of the reality of everyday human behavior and conduct. From such simplicities spring later complexities like war spirit, personal and group contention, social misunderstandings, broken homes, and crimes. Secondly, three needs stand forth before we can formulate a new and scientific ethical and moral system. These are: First, more pure, unindoctrinated facts; more knowledge. For had the woman in instance one known enough to realize all the implications of what her daughter was doing, to evaluate the phenomena of reality more properly, and to visualize consequences by a process of imaginative abstract thought based, however, on knowledge, she might have acted differently. The misfortune remains that a state university thoughtlessly considers it acts upon a sound psychological and intellectual principle when it inculcates marksmanship.

The second need is that for the meticulous and rigorous definition of terms. The two men who argued had no fixed definition for the words "system" and "efficiency." Probably old Chaos himself thought he was quite systematic in Walt Whitman's notoriously unsystematic way, or in the manner of literary gentlemen who can find nothing at all after prim people straighten up their studies. However, it would be possible to go fact-finding and perhaps to discover what system was best in this or that office, how much system enabled it to function more efficiently and just where superfluous system became an impediment. Facts would be needed first; then careful and precise definition of terms so that everyone interested could understand perfectly the ideas for which certain word symbols stood.

Hence a third thing is needed. It is a sort of personal thing and it involves emotional discipline on the one hand and, on the other, a reluctance to interpret our own sincere private opinions, or the basic postulates which we happen to respect, as indiscriminately good for all and sundry. The woman who bought shoes had a different standard of values from that of her husband; this quite

naturally involved a different standard of conduct and a different interpretation of what constitutes bad conduct—rudeness in this case. She called her husband ignorant and rude. She was very much irritated at the time. She was in such an emotional pet that she was psychologically incapable of reasoning dispassionately or accurately. For she knew that her husband was not only highly educated—he had advanced university degrees; but he was widely known and recognized as a profound scholar, extraordinarily informed on social questions.

Now, having been irritated into a pet the woman became rude through lack of emotional discipline. Grant, for sake of argument, that her husband's action was mildly rude; it had a powerful intellectual drive behind it; he had a subject of great human importance in mind and his offense was a minor infraction of courtesy. Hers was public, sustained, and emphatic. But worse still she rationalized her own irritation and rudeness as the just wrath of a highly cultivated lady at the boorishness of an unmannerly clown. This argued that her standard was the best and the only possible standard of values; that she had a perfect right to impose it on other people because "all decent people" (and was she not their accredited representative?) behaved in accordance therewith. Her husband's emotions were under such complete control that he neither ridiculed the onslaught nor replied in kind. He was so tactful that it disappeared without leaving a ripple and he acted thus first because he had acquaintance with a wide field of knowledge about human behavior, and secondly because he knew it would be absurd for him, in turn, to set up his personal conduct and emotional reactions as the standard of right for anyone—especially for his wife!

But, you say, this is silly. This is petty. These are mere casual individuals and insignificant incidents of no import. Admitting that they indicate some ethical confusion in the minds of individuals, there is an ethical system universally recognized as correct and people should be urged to try and live in accordance therewith. Right there I differ. I contend that the reason people are so pettish, so confused, so ignorantly superficial, or so sincerely perplexed is because we have not taken the trouble to formulate any scientific system of ethics based upon the facts of reality as at present ascertainable. I admit that ethical theories of conduct must in any case be based upon a postulate. I even admit that you can base them on a varied assortment of mutually antipathetic postulates and, by

sufficiently disregarding your beliefs in fiction when you are in contact with an imperious bit of reality, live about the same "good" life in any case. But I argue that this sort of thing is itself helter-skelter and chaotic and that we owe it to ourselves to formulate a scientific system of ethics.

Consider very briefly the extant ethical systems. What postulates are assumed by various ethical systems—very, very respectable systems too—in order to build good lives thereupon? One is the existence of a god, of one sort or another, who makes demands of one sort or another. This postulate is secure and helpful so long as societies are primitive and homogenous and so long as the god is defined quite precisely by the group as a whole, and a vast majority of the group as individuals concur the rightness of the definition. In a society such as ours where god is defined so utterly differently by so many individuals or groups, this postulate is valueless. It amounts to no more than asking the god to ratify our own highest notion of what ought to be, which is a phrase-garb used to protect errant and anemic fictions from the bleak winds of reality.

We may revert to conscientious sentimentalism. We may take as our basic postulate some such sentiment as pity, sympathy, altruism, unselfishness or the pious and fervid affirmation of a fundamental principle from which practical morality certainly *ought* to be deduced. But what has this to do with the teeming reality which surrounds us? We may take Kant's imperative and seek so to act that things will become better by our acting so, but to refrain from acts which would make things worse if everyone committed them. But what do we mean by better and worse? We may say with him that the good will is that which acts out of respect for moral law and may therefore alone be held to be morally good, which is a charming verbal rondelet but seems somehow to lack grasp on reality. We may make all sorts of *a priori* rules; we may invoke hedonism or utilitarianism; we may actually postulate a principle in reverse to all that is usually considered good and moral and deduce therefrom some system, like that which rules a gang, which is singularly ethical within a restricted group.

We need go no further than the law to discover how much at sea we really are in such matters. I perform a certain act. I happen to be seen and apprehended. I happen to be relatively poor. I am therefore brought to trial for a penitentiary offense. I am to be judged by a learned judge and a jury of my peers. In what does

this justice inhere? How is the case decided? Normally in one of two ways, ignoring as incidental to any case at law the emotional and fact-obfuscating antics of lawyers of sorts who seek to raise doubts, confuse and mislead. Way number one consists in citing precedents. The lawyers go back to look for cases like mine and to discover what was done about such cases. Yet there never was in the history of the world a case just like mine though the decision is rendered in terms of that case which may have been tried a decade or two ago under entirely different circumstances. (Remember always that under the same law reading the Constitution in public sometimes is and sometimes is not criminal.) Actually the case cited as precedent had nothing whatever to do with me standing here and now before a judge for this particular offense. It is a mere fiction to assume that it could have anything to do with my case which cannot be subsumed under it without assuming a decision in advance, a contingency the whole absurd process has been invoked to avoid.

Process number two is that of deliberately making some imposing fundamental postulate in resounding and impressive terms and in asserting that my action is inimical to social stability. Thus, the law being quite the same in each case, it may at one time be stated by the judge that the reading of the Constitution by the prisoner at the bar constituted an incendiary act inimical to society and that acts inimical to society must be penalized by so many years in the penitentiary; at another time it may be stated that the innocent reading of the Constitution does not constitute an act inimical to society and that anyway it is a fundamental postulate in this country that we have freedom of speech and expression at all times—therefore the prisoner should be dismissed and perhaps eulogized.

Neither legal process seeks to interrogate the facts of reality, to ascertain all the particulars relevant to this specific event and to arrive at a dispassionately scientific judgment on the basis of those facts. True enough this process is rendered difficult in the absence of some well-formulated system of rational ethics. Just that is what is needed and leading thinkers recognize this. Thus we find Whitehead saying in *Process and Reality*:

"The actual entity, in a state of process during which it is not fully definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is the whole point of moral responsibility. Such responsibility is conditioned by the limits of the data, and by the categoreal conditions of concrecence."

Whitehead is trying to write like a philosopher and it is a fiction among them that the simplest truths must be stated in the most forbidding language, but he evidently means about what I have just said above. John Dewey, who shares the fiction that confused verbiage is a great philosophic advantage, says this in writing on "Individualism, Old and New" in *The New Republic* for February 5, 1930 (p. 296):

Individuals will refine themselves only as their ideas and ideals are brought into harmony with the realities of the corporate age in which they act. The task of attaining this harmony is not an easy one. But it is more negative than it seems, more negative than positive. If we could inhibit the principles and standards that are merely traditional, if we could slough off the opinions that have no living relationship to the situations in which we live, the unavowed forces that now work upon us unconsciously but unremittingly would have a chance to build minds after their own pattern, and individuals would, in consequence, find themselves in possession of objects to which imagination and emotion could stably attach themselves.

Again this needs translation. For one impediment to clear thinking on the part of the masses is that its thinkers have quite universally invested belief in the fiction that fundamental truths cannot be expressed simply, perhaps for fear that being too easily understood they will not win respect. However, Dewey must mean that our ethical system should be in harmony with the reality of the age in which we now live. Shaw (in his *Intelligent Woman's Guide*) naturally expressed the idea much more plainly. He simply said:

The reason we are in such a mess at present is that our governments are trying to carry on with a set of beliefs that belong to bygone phases of science and extinct civilizations. Imagine going to Moses or Mahomet for a code to regulate the modern money market.

Where does this leave us? As omniscient beings, when we regard molecules, we observe that they follow certain statistical rules and we formulate a system of physics designed to explain what molecules do. But all molecules do not do what we say they do; however, enough of them follow our propositions for us to say that they are in statistical agreement with our scientific hypotheses. In the social sciences, however, we are not omniscient beings. We are rather curious, precocious molecules of a gas seeking objectively to determine the physical laws which statistically govern the gas of which we ourselves form an intimate part at the time. We try to be objective, but we remain human. If we find a statistical law which we do not happen to follow we say it is not "right" even though the vast majority of molecules do follow it. We must con-

trol our emotions and try to realize that all human molecules do not necessarily do what we do. Hence we must look to scientists, who try very hard to be objective, to study these questions and, using the same scientific method they use in physics, formulate an ethical system that has reality.

How far can our American scientists, who do delve into general and social problems, be expected to make scientific method understood to the masses and to advise its use in the solution of ethical problems? I can cite but one here. However, he is a leading scientist-sermonizer on public questions and his scientific reputation is unassailable. Of his frequent sermons I pick the one on "Alleged Sins of Science" which appeared in February, 1930, *Scribners*. Herein he defends science against all charges of having done evil. He is unwilling to admit, for instance, that science helped cause the Great War and helped make it horrible. Yet he has done nothing of which I am aware to formulate a system of scientific ethics which would make war anachronistic. Instead he comes out at this late date for the Golden Rule and greets with joy increased church membership. He takes a fling at loose morals and at the new art and literary forms. The gist of his attitude may be found in this sentence:

"Rather does the scientist join with the psalmist of thousands of years ago in reverently proclaiming 'the Heavens declare the glory of God and the Firmament sheweth his handiwork.' The God of Science is the spirit of rational order and of orderly development, the integrating factor in the world of atoms and of ether and of ideas and of duties and of intelligence. Materialism is surely not a sin of modern science."

This is nothing more nor less than an effort to make old bottles hold new wine and to preserve the pretended reality of what may once have been a humanly helpful hypothesis but what is now an antiquated fiction as a basic postulate for a system of ethics.

I turn from this to a statement of Prof. Albert Einstein which appeared in the *New York Times* during January, 1930. It was in part as follows:

"It has now become a general recognized axiom that the giant armaments of all nations are proving highly injurious to them collectively. I am even inclined to go a step further by the assertion that, under present-day conditions, any one state would incur no appreciable risk by undertaking to disarm—wholly regardless of the attitude of the other states. If such were not the case it would be quite evident that the situation of such states as are unarmed or only partially equipped for defense would be extremely difficult, dangerous, and disadvantageous—a condition which is refuted by the facts. I am con-

vinced that demonstrative references to armaments are but a weapon in the hands of the factors interested in their production or in the maintenance and development of a military system for financial or political-egotistic reasons. I am firmly of the opinion that the educational effect of a first and genuine achievement in the realm of disarmament would prove highly efficacious, because the succeeding second and third steps would then be immeasurably simpler than the initial one; this for the obvious reason that the first results of an understanding would considerably weaken the familiar argument for national security with which parliamentarians of all countries now permit themselves to be intimidated. Armaments can never be viewed as an economic asset to a state. They must ever remain the unproductive exploitation of men and material and an encroachment on the economic reserves of a state through the temporary conscription of men in the active periods of their lives—not to mention the moral impairment resulting from a preoccupation with the profession of war and the moral processes of preparing a nation for it."

Here, by contrast with the American Millikan, we find the words of a socially conscious scientist who speaks from an intimate knowledge of the facts of reality and who makes no use whatever of archaic fictions. The contrast is striking but I know no physical scientist in America capable of such a statement, though a few isolated social scientists might be cited. I know also that no one would greet with greater covered or overt hostility an effort to apply scientific method to the social problems of today's reality than the leaders and publications of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Their constant admonition is go easy, do not be controversial, do not be adversely critical, avoid acrimonious issues—a curiously timid and sequacious attitude indeed, and one from which we have little to hope.

This brings me to a brief concluding statement which may be inadequate but should serve to outline how a useful system of scientific ethics could be evolved. Morals or ethics should be the subject of a system of causes deliberately created as the premises of reasoning; the conclusions deduced from these premises must coincide with the rules of practical morality the recognition of which life has forced upon us, regardless of our past systems and postulates, and which constitute the reality of ethics or morals. How can we go about elaborating this system?

First the rules of the moral reality of the here and now must be clearly expressed. What are people doing and why are they doing what they do? How do psychopathic and economic factors condition their conduct? Such questions as these must be answered statistically by the collection of more facts, more instances, more

specific particulars which, in turn, will be more knowledge. Today too many social scientists follow the old technic of laying down *a priori* postulates and then only collecting such facts as fit into their preconceived fictions. The facts they do collect are therefore indoctrinated. Instead of this a vast number of fact-finding agencies must collect and correlate facts in some such manner as the economic bureaus of the Department of Agriculture do in order to trace price trends or to find out how hard farm women really work and what they think.

This done, and it will take quite a while before it is scientifically worth while to do anything else, the production of axioms and definitions will follow. Broad statements—laws which form hypotheses—must be formulated and each word in them must be clearly defined. Their entire meaning must also be precise and their axioms simply expressed. From these premises propositions must then be derived. Had we had them in hand, for instance, in 1917 it would have been quite possible for social scientists to have predicted with fair accuracy just what would happen in the United States after the passage of the Volstead Act. Had it been possible to present these facts to the public in simple, non-hysterical terms, an intelligent vote might have been taken upon an abstraction which, in turn, might have saved us from many crimes and other devious necessities we had, instead, wastefully to learn from reality.

The propositions deduced from the premises must coincide with the empirical moral rules of reality. If the system leads us to deduce that all parents will instinctively treat their children kindly any juvenile court official can tell us how unreal and fictional our system must be, for so many parents are deliberately very cruel to their own children. We must make sure of such coincidences and keep them as perfect as possible. Then at last we shall be in a position to develop an entire theory by deducing from the initial propositions, as in geometry, all of the theorems those propositions logically entail. These theorems must again be compared with the facts of reality, as we go along. As long as facts and theorems are compatible we are on the right track; when the contrary is true we must modify or replace our ethical system of causes, for it has then become a pure fiction and can no longer have wide practical utility.

This process would still leave quite a number of systems of ethics in existence from which to choose, each seeming logically valid to about the same extent as the others. Dozens of systems

would, however, fortunately be eliminated at once and need occupy us no more. They could be taught historically but not as valid in present reality. Finally, that ethical system should be adopted which was based on the smallest number of theorems and those most consistently connected with the existing body of science as a whole. This system would, like the present system of physics, explain the phenomena of reality and would also be a time and labor saving device by predicting future realities for us in various postulated terms.

Reverting now to my original three "trivial" cases—what would this mean? 1. It would necessitate getting more facts and broadening knowledge, because human beings are so constructed that they automatically act differently when in possession of a large number of facts than when in possession of very few, or of errors. 2. It would necessitate the clear and concise definition of word-symbols, axioms and propositions, so that like chemists when engaged in their profession, we should all everywhere know what a person was talking about when he said system, or good, or efficiency. 3. It would necessitate sufficient discipline of the emotions to enable us to refrain from interpreting our personal opinions as true for all men, and to reason logically and dispassionately about the facts of reality which confront us.

To accentuate our present ignorance I may cite an example that appeared in the paper on the day I wrote this. We all know that a great many people regard the high-priced workers in the building trades as unethical gougers who overcharge and underwork. This is a very common opinion and one often expressed without any tangible evidence being cited. Actually it is a fiction. If the twenty thousand skilled building mechanics of the District of Columbia average two hundred days work a year apiece they may consider themselves fortunate. It is improbable then that their average income will be equal to the monetary expenditure expert economists declare to be necessary for the adequate support of a family of five. Their work is seasonal and they have to charge whatever they can get when they work in order to tide them over periods of ill-timed idleness. At the moment six thousand of them happen to be out of work and the unions are endeavoring to write the five-day week into every agreement made with employers in order to distribute the quantity of work about more evenly among the workers and during the year. Here we have a situation in reality and certain labor

unions have endeavored to meet it in the only way they know how in view of the limited number of facts available to them.

Actually the building industry is one of many industries and is closely related thereto. We need a specific number of new buildings annually and we need a specific number of mechanics to construct them. We also need so much coal, so many pianos, so many loaves of bread and so many fountain pens. However, nobody knows how many of any of these things the country needs—what the relative importance of various industries is, or exactly what number of workmen should be engaged in each. Perhaps we have too many building mechanics as things are. Who knows? Perhaps their effort to get a five-day week is socially, economically, and ethically expedient. Who knows? We have no code to guide us in such matters because we lack a system of economics related to present-day reality quite as surely as we lack a system of ethics. Therefore many of us regard as maliciously unethical a group of workmen who are trying in the only way they know how to solve a pressing economic problem. The method is imperfect because they do not know all the facts, and no fact-finding agency has taken the trouble to ascertain them and construct a rational system related to reality. So we go ahead blindly and whether labor is "right" or "wrong" in its action we cannot tell. Evidences of this self-same muddle-headedness may be discerned in every branch of the social sciences,—economics, politics, group conduct or ethics, and the only way we can get anywhere is by accumulating more knowledge, adopting definite terms and axioms, and dispassionately building objective logical systems statistically true to the reality of our time.

THE PATTERNS OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

BY CLARENCE ERICKSON

(Concluded)

THE oldest articulate form of Dualism is the ancient Persian religion, given to the Persians in the sixth century B. C. by Zoroaster, otherwise known as Zarathustra. Reality is conceived as a struggle between two irreconcilable principles, Light and Darkness, Good and Evil. This ethical Dualism is represented in the Christian religion to this day in the conception of the conflict between God and evil, or the personification of evil in the shape of Satan.

The classic example of philosophic Dualism is the philosophy of Plato. We have already discussed Plato's philosophy under Spiritualism, as he is usually classed with the Idealist philosophers, because of his emphasis upon the supernal realm of the Ideas.

In Aristotle we find somewhat of an attempt to resolve the sharply-sundered Dualism into more of a unity. *Form* has now taken the place of *Idea*, and *Form* can only be realized through the medium of matter. Matter is that which has the potentiality of becoming something, while Form is the directive principle which guides and determines the process of becoming.

Scholasticism, the official philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church, is a modified form of Aristotelianism. Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth century scholastic, is the thinker who did the greatest part of the work of adaptation. The Scholastic philosophy, with a few modern revisions, still reigns in Catholic institutions of learning.

Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, that is, philosophy after the Renaissance, was also an exponent of Dualism. Reality is composed of two substances; matter, or extended substance, and spirit, or thinking substance. The essence of matter is its space-

filling property, said Descartes, while the essence of spirit is its property of thought or consciousness. Also, spirit is unextended, does not fill space. God is the creator of both matter and spirit, but Himself is a pure spirit. Only man, in the Cartesian scheme, has a soul. All animals other than man are unconscious chemical machines, strictly mechanical in their behavior, which is a rigid mechanism of causes and effects. Indeed, the entire material world is a mechanism, capable of being reduced to a realm of cause and effect by science, according to Descartes. The material body of man, too, is a machine. But the conduct of this body-machine is somehow controlled by the soul, which comes in contact with the nervous system through its seat in the pineal gland, in the middle of the forehead, thought Descartes.

The weak point in Descartes' system obviously is his inconsistency in sharply sundering spirit from matter, and then assuming that spirit can interact with the body-machine and influence its actions. If the material world, the human body included is a complete and closed circuit of mechanically determined causes and effects, how can a spiritual cause break its way into the already complete chain of material causation? How can matter and spirit, by definition belonging to two different realms of being, act upon one another?

Cartesian Dualism, then, proved to be an unstable philosophy, owing to the impossibility of accounting for the interaction of matter and spirit. The philosophy of Descartes evolved into two other philosophies. Spinoza resolved the Dualism into a Monism by setting up the hypothesis of a single substance, which is God, making itself known to us by two attributes or aspects, Matter and Spirit.

Another school of philosophers, seizing upon Descartes' idea of mechanical causation in the material realm of being, founded the mechanistic philosophy, which holds that the universe is a machine, an iron-clad reign of cause and effect. Spiritual substance was discarded by the mechanists as a superfluity. They attempted to explain away the fact of consciousness by reducing it to a motion of material particles.

The Behaviorist psychology is based on the mechanistic hypothesis. Hence its denial of consciousness, since there is no place for it in a closed circuit of material causes and effects. A rather drastic way of getting rid of a troublesome fact that does not fit into a

preconceived theory! What fact can be more certain than the fundamental fact of consciousness? John B. Watson says that consciousness probably is an illusion. But an illusion itself is a state of consciousness, a mental state that is wrongly interpreted. If there were no such thing as consciousness there could be no such thing as illusion. Therefore in admitting the existence of illusion Watson is also admitting the existence of consciousness.

Getting back to our subject, Dualism is represented to-day by Bergson, the Neo-Platonists, the Scholastics, and a few other philosophies of less importance. The Dualism of Bergson demands a word of notice. The dichotomous division, characteristic of every form of Dualism, is made between matter and a Life Force, or *Elan Vital*, which pushes its way up through matter in higher and higher forms of life by means of a process of Creative Evolution. Bernard Shaw is an adherent of this doctrine. In connection with the science of biology the theory is known as Vitalism. Biologists are divided into two camps, the vitalists and the mechanists. The latter maintain that life is a purely physico-chemical affair, in opposition to the former, who believe in an *Elan Vital* which animates matter and raises it from the inorganic to the organic level.

We are now ready for a brief discussion of Monism. The word stands for a philosophical attempt to reduce reality to one principle, or one substance. Hence, both Materialism and Spiritualism are forms of Monism, in that they set up either matter or spirit as the only substance. But in actual philosophical usage the term *Monism* is generally reserved for a doctrine which received its most characteristic expression in Spinoza, the Moorish-Jewish philosopher who lived in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century.

We have already seen how the Dualism of Descartes evolved into the Monism of Spinoza. The great difficulty inherent in Dualistic systems is the problem of accounting for the interaction and connection of two such sharply-sundered substances as matter and spirit. Spinoza escaped this difficulty by affirming a single substance which manifests itself in two attributes, matter and spirit. This substance he called God, the One, the All. Spinoza's system therefore is a Pantheism, since God and the world are one. Dualism is theistic; that is, God is conceived of as being apart from and distinct from the world. Spiritualism obviously is also pantheistic, while Materialism is atheistic.

In Spinoza's Monism the problem of the relation of matter to spirit is solved by assuming the parallelism of the material and spiritual aspects of the one true substance. Every material phenomenon has accompanying it a parallel psychic phenomenon. When a chain of causes and effects passes through a circuit of sense organs, sensory nerves, brain, and motor nerves, issuing in a muscular response, the material circuit is complete in itself. But accompanying this closed material circuit is a parallel circuit of mental causes and effects, composed of sensations, perceptions, volitions, and other states of consciousness. As Huxley has put it, for every *neurosis* there must be a *psychosis*, and vice versa. That is, for every movement of the particles composing the nervous system, there must be a definite accompanying state of consciousness in the psychic aspect of being. In psychology this doctrine is called *psycho-physiological parallelism*.

According to Spinoza, not only is every neurosis accompanied by a psychosis, but every physical phenomenon has its corresponding psychical correlate. Thus even atoms and electrons have, in a very rudimentary form of course a psychic life. The interconnection of physical and psychical, of material and spiritual, is very easily accounted for on this hypothesis. Underlying both matter and spirit, and fundamental to both of them, is the true reality or substance, and hence neither material nor spiritual causation is ultimate. The true causal activity takes place in the one true substance, which Spinoza calls God, and manifests itself to us in the two parallel aspects, known to us as matter and spirit. It follows that spirit cannot influence matter; neither can matter influence spirit. Both must change in parallelism with one another, through changes in the underlying substance. Body and soul, then, are a unit, and not two separate things as Dualism contends.

There is no exact prototype of Monism among the ancient philosophers, because the mind-body problem is a comparatively recent development. The earliest Greek thinkers, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, however, somewhat approximate Monism. The problem of philosophy for them was to find the one permanent substance beneath all the diversity of the world. Thales thought that water was this primal element. Anaximenes held that it was air, while Anaximander said that the *apeiron*, the limitless, a sort of fiery mist, had condensed itself into things as we know them. The

primal substance, whether water, air, or the limitless, was alive. These early philosophers took this for granted because the distinction between organic and inorganic, between consciousness and unconsciousness, had never occurred to them.

The Stoic philosophers held a doctrine also roughly similar to that of Spinoza, inasmuch as they held that the universe is a unity, animated by the World Reason, of the laws of nature. The Stoics are best known for their ethical doctrines, which were widely current among the Romans before the Empire adopted Christianity. Marcus Aurelius, the philosopher-emperor and the author of the famous *Meditations*, was a Stoic. Conformity to Natural Law, or the World Reason, is the essence of the Stoic ethic. Reality has an ethical drift, and we must find this drift and live in harmony with it if we would work out our ethical salvation.

At this point it will be useful to compare the ethics of the systems of philosophy we have so far reviewed. Materialism and Naturalism hold that moral law is social or human law; Dualism finds moral law in Divine law, or the law of a God or Creator; Monism maintains that moral law is Natural law. In systems of Spiritualism, evil is considered either as a necessary step leading to an ultimate good; or else an illusion proceeding from our ignorance of the ways of the Absolute. Spiritualism has ever found the problem of evil its great stumbling block, and its ethical theory is more or less an attempt to explain away evil, rather than to meet it squarely.

Returning to the subject of Monism, we find that it is still a live philosophy to-day. Many scientists see in it the only theory that does full justice to both physical science and the facts of consciousness and mental life. It is a combination of Materialism and Spiritualism, retaining the strong features of both while escaping their difficulties. Albert Einstein, while not definitely committing himself to any system of philosophy, has confessed that he feels strongly drawn toward the Pantheism of Spinoza. Two eminent modern philosophers, S. Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan, the latter a noted biologist, are followers of Spinoza and his Monism.

We are now ready for a brief examination of Sensationalism, or Phenomenalism as it is also called. Both of the above words have unfortunate popular connotations. The reader must not suppose that Sensationalism is the philosophy of the modern newspa-

per man. Philosophic Sensationalism has no conception whatever with journalistic sensationalism.

In our discussions of Spiritualism and Dualism we were obliged to anticipate a great deal of our discussion of Phenomenalism, in order to show the influence of Hume, the typical philosopher of Phenomenalism, on Kant and all later philosophers. This is another instance of the profound influence even rival systems of thought exercise upon one another. It is impossible to discuss a single one of the fundamental types of philosophy without bringing every other type into the discussion. There could be no more convincing refutation of the notion that the different philosophers are entirely out of touch with one another, and that nothing permanent is ever accomplished in philosophy.

As we have seen, Phenomenalism was introduced into philosophy by David Hume, the eighteenth century Scotch philosopher and historian. His doctrine was the next step in the evolution of the thought of Locke and Berkeley.

Locke had been a Dualist, maintaining the independent existence of both mind and matter. But he left an opening in his system that was to serve as the starting point of his successor, Berkeley. Locke distinguished between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter. The primary qualities were hardness, durability, and extension in space, while the secondary qualities were color, sound, odor, etc. Only the primary qualities were objective, that is, belonging to matter in its own right. The secondary qualities were subjective, or contributed by our own minds, believed Locke.

Berkeley demonstrated that the so-called primary qualities of matter were just as subjective as the secondary qualities, and that all our impressions of matter were mental. He dropped the notion of material substance and reduced reality to spiritual or mental substance alone.

Hume logically completed the evolution of this line of thought by destroying the notion of spiritual substance. We have already seen the arguments by which he brought about this result. In a word, he demonstrated that the notion of spiritual substance underlying our sensations, perceptions, volitions, and memories was an inference that would not hold water logically. Nothing was now left existing except sensations or phenomena. Hence the terms

Sensationalism or Phenomenalism in connection with Hume's system.

Along with Hume's Phenomenalism went a doctrine of causation that threatened to knock the foundations from under not only Religion, but Science as well. If we analyze our notions of cause and effect carefully, said Hume, we can find no compulsion, no necessity in any given effect following a given cause. When one billiard ball strikes another billiard ball we expect the latter to be set into motion by the former. We think that the effect must of necessity follow the cause. But a little analysis reveals that it is not a certainty, but only a probability—a very high probability in this case—that ball B will be set into motion by Ball A. Suppose that one had never seen the collision of two billiard balls, or of two pieces of matter of any kind. Would one be able to deduce beforehand that ball B would have motion transmitted to it by ball A? We can find no logical reason why any effect should follow from a given cause. In the above example, to one who had never seen the phenomenon in question, it would be just as logical to suppose that the second ball would fly off into space, or remain stationary while checking the first ball. Almost anything could be supposed to happen and pure logic would be powerless to choose between the alternatives.

In truth, we learn the sequence of any given "cause" and "effect" relationship only through experience. The mind then associates the two, so that when we see A we naturally expect to see B follow. The greater the number of times our anticipation is fulfilled, the stronger our mental association of A and B becomes. But from this we cannot logically deduce that A and B are bound together by a causal necessity. All that we can say is that it is highly *probable* that B will follow A.

It is through the influence of Hume's above analysis of the cause and effect relationship, by which he reduced causation to little more than an association of ideas, that the terms *cause* and *effect* have fallen into disfavor among scientists, and that *antecedent* and *consequent* have taken their place. The laws of science, any careful modern scientist will hold, are mere statements of probability, not rigid, invariable "laws" of nature.

Hume's analysis of causation also had momentous implications for Religion. The two strongest arguments for the existence of

God, the *cosmological* and the *teleological* arguments, were based on the older notion of causality. In the cosmological proof the universe was considered the "effect" which only God as a "cause" could explain. The teleological argument held that the design and purpose apparently evident in the world pointed to a "cause" in the form of an intelligent being who did the designing. By demolishing the concept of causation and substituting for it the concept of mere sequence, Hume rendered it impossible to prove the existence of a Deity. Hume's philosophy, then, gave a tremendous impetus to Agnosticism. Thereafter, belief in God could be only a matter of faith, faith unassisted by reason. It may interest the reader to know that Hume himself had faith in the existence of God.

There are no ancient prototypes of Phenomenalism, because that philosophy is a very modern development. The Greek Sophists, however, somewhat approximated Phenomenalism in their skepticism. Real knowledge is impossible, all knowledge is opinion, believed most of the Sophists. The most extreme form of this skepticism was that of Gorgias, who said, "Nothing exists; if anything existed it could not be known; if anything could be known it could not be communicated to others."

Humian Phenomenalism is in great favor to-day among a brilliant school of philosophers who have approached philosophy through the gateway of science. Karl Pearson, the English physicist and mathematician; Wilhelm Ostwald, the German chemist; and Ernst Mach, an Austrian author of great works on physics and mechanics, have philosophical systems very closely resembling Hume's Phenomenalism.

Hume was, perhaps, the most influential philosopher in the history of European philosophy, although that fact is not adequately realized. Indeed, it can be said without fear of exaggeration that every system of philosophy after Hume up to the present day bears unmistakable signs of Hume's influence. We have already seen how the systems of Kant and the German Idealist were attempts, in part at least, to escape the skepticism of Hume. Other schools of philosophy hold that Kant's refutation of Hume was an evasion rather than a real answer, and hence Hume's doctrines play even a greater part in the systems other than German Idealism.

We have now completed our survey of the fundamental types of philosophy. It now remains for us to demonstrate how complex

modern systems of philosophy can be analyzed into their simple components.

Let us take the philosophy called Pragmatism, certainly one of the dominating systems of to-day. Pragmatism also goes under the names of Humanism, and Instrumentalism. William James is usually associated with Pragmatism, F. C. S. Schiller with Humanism, and John Dewey with Instrumentalism. This difference in terminology must not be allowed to mislead the reader. Pragmatism, Humanism, and Instrumentalism represent what is substantially one system of thought.

Pragmatists (whatever they may call themselves) frequently speak of a doctrine called "radical empiricism." Radical empiricism is a species of Humanism or Phenomenalism, in that it holds that the world of actual experience, the world of sensations and perceptions, is the real world. When the Pragmatist says that the world is made of a stuff called "pure experience" he is merely advancing the doctrine of Phenomenalism.

The most characteristic teaching of Pragmatism is its famous theory of truth. Truth, according to Pragmatists, is a mental weapon forged by the mind for the purpose of gaining control over experience. For example, the atomic theory of chemistry is a concept or mental tool which has enabled us to enrich our experience to a marvellous extent. We all know the rôle modern chemistry has played in medicine, industry, and in many other walks of life. It is unessential whether atoms really exist or not. The atomic theory is true, according to the Pragmatist, because it has proved such a potent instrument in gaining control over our environment and enhancing the fullness of our lives. Utility and workability are the principal tests of truth.

This doctrine of truth is not new by any means. It was hinted by one of the ancient Greek Sophists, Protagoras, who said, "Man is the measure of all things." The Pragmatic view of truth is a natural development proceeding from the skepticism of Hume. If we can have no knowledge other than that of probabilities and sequences, it behooves us to accept those sequences as true which it is useful for us to accept as true.

Let us subject the system of Bertrand Russell to our method of chemical analysis. We find that Russell's views on ethics and religion are similar to those of Epicurus. Moral codes and systems

are merely human devices for securing the maximum of happiness for man; religion to Russell is a species of fear, which it is to man's interest to leave behind him. The world, according to Russell, is made of a stuff that is neither mind nor matter. "Neutral monism" is the name given this doctrine. This neutral stuff consists of "events." The entire conception is a variety of Humian Phenomenalism, for the "events" are phenomena or sensations. Russell places great faith in the absolute nature of mathematical truth, which he holds is independent of experience. In this respect, then, Russell is somewhat of a Platonist, since he affirms the independent existence of abstract ideas in the form of mathematical propositions. Thus the philosophical system of Bertrand Russell is a compound of Naturalism, Phenomenalism, and Platonism.

What are some of the benefits that would accrue from a more widespread interest in philosophy? Has philosophy any practical value?

The reading of the philosophers cannot help having a beneficent effect on one's character and ideals. Contact with the great philosophers, who were invariably men of the loftiest character and the highest moral idealism, is an experience fully as worthwhile as contact with the great minds of literature, music, and art. The calm, quiet pleasures of reflection and study come to be valued more highly than the degrading pleasures of modern life. Our hurried, but withal aimless, lives, are largely the outcome of false valuations and ideals. The lust for material gain is largely responsible for the feverish tempo of modern life. A truer sense of values, which the study of philosophy can hardly fail to instil, would do much toward freeing man's mind of the low ideals and petty material ambitions which are responsible for so many of the ills of modern society.

THE ENGLISHMAN WHO BECAME A POPE

BY J. V. NASH

THE recent agreement entered into between Premier Mussolini and the Vatican, resulting in the restoration—along much restricted lines—of the temporal power of the Pope, opens up a number of unusual prospects for the future of the papacy.

For instance, there is the possibility of the election, for the first time since the Reformation, of a non-Italian Pope. While the relations of Italy and the Vatican were still unsettled, the choice of a foreign Pope would have been extremely hazardous. The Italian government, if brought into conflict with an alien Pontiff, might have used his nationality as an excuse for his expulsion from Italy and possibly for abolishing the papacy or subjecting it to the secular power. But since the Vatican has secured the rights of a sovereign nation, under treaty guaranties, these difficulties disappear, and the question already is being asked, will the next Pope be an American?

Although in pre-Reformation days there were many non-Italian Popes, it is curious that Ireland, for centuries the chief bulwark of Catholicism in northern Europe and famed as "the Isle of Saints," whence missionaries went out to convert European pagans, has never given a Pope to the Church, while Anglo-Saxon England can claim at least one Roman Pontiff. Stranger still, it has been charged—rightly or wrongly—that this English Pope was the cause of Ireland's long political subjection to England, from which she has only in our own day to a large extent freed herself.

The story of the English Pope is one of the most singular and romantic in the checkered history of the papacy. Being so little known to-day, it is worth recalling at this time. In order to follow its course more realistically, let us transport ourselves in spirit back to the year 1100 A. D.

In that year, the Norman kings had already held England for a generation; a Westminster Abbey occupied the site of the present reconstructed building, the fortress-church of Mont-Saint-Michel stood guard before the French coast, much the same in appearance as it has been described by Henry Adams in our time, and the glory of the cathedral of Chartres was already born. In Venice, St. Mark's looked out over the Adriatic, but in Rome St. Peter's was far different from the magnificent Renaissance basilica known to our modern tourists.

About twenty miles northwest of London lay the ancient town of St. Albans, where visitors nowadays seek out in St. Michael's church the tomb of the great Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, one-time Lord Chancellor of England, essayist and philosopher.

St. Albans was built near the site of the Roman city of Verulamium, bricks and stones from the ruins of which were used in the construction of early Christian churches, in the walls of which they are still visible. The beginnings of St. Albans itself far antedated the coming of the Anglo-Saxons. Here, according to tradition, the saint from which the present town takes its name was martyred in 303 A. D., a Christian church being built on the spot. Centuries rolled by, and in 793 Offa, the Saxon king of Mercia, who believed that he had discovered the relics of the saint, caused to be erected to "the blessed martyr's" memory a great monastery which in time became one of the wealthiest and most renowned in all England.

Before the end of the tenth century, the abbot of St. Albans began the construction of a magnificent abbey church. Wars delayed its erection, which was not pushed ahead until after the Norman conquest. It finally was consecrated in 1115, although completed long before. The great abbey church of St. Albans, much changed and restored, but with some of its original architecture remaining, still stands above the little river Ver, overlooking the pleasant English countryside. Here, in this peaceful land, much bloody fighting took place in the Wars of the Roses.

Hertfordshire, the county of which St. Albans is a municipal borough and market town, offers a typical English landscape of wooded hills and fertile valleys, with the chalk-downs of the Chilton Hills lying low on the northern horizon. Storied streams, such as

the Lea and the Colne, tributaries of the Thames, and the Ivel and the New wander through the rolling terrain. Except for the presence of railways, the general aspect of Hertfordshire has not changed much between 1100 A. D. and the twentieth century. Such was the setting of St. Albans in 1115 A. D., when the glorious abbey church was dedicated.

One day in the summer of that year, a barefoot Saxon boy of fourteen or fifteen years might have been observed trudging along the dusty highway leading to the monastery gates. The little fellow's home was at Abbot's Langley, a feudal fief of the monastery of St. Albans a short distance away. His name was Nicholas Breakspeare.

It is rather singular that the names of the two Englishmen who have attained positions of universal sovereignty in Christendom, the one as Supreme Poet of the people and the other as Supreme Pontiff of the still undivided church, should have been so curiously alike. The name Breakspeare, like Shakespeare, has alternative spellings: e.g., Brekespear and Braksperere. Both men were of humble origin, and authentic biographical information about them is almost equally scanty.

The boy Nicholas' father, Robert Breakspeare, while of lowly station, seems to have come of worthy stock. According to William of Newburgh, a contemporary Augustinian canon and chronicler, the elder Breakspeare was of "slender means." Nothing is known of the mother except that she survived for many years; for after Nicholas became Pope we hear of her appealing to him for financial aid.

But to return to the boy, whom we left making his way along the English highway on that summer day in 1115. At last he reached the great outer gate of the monastery, at which he knocked timidly. In due time it was opened by a friar. The latter, recognizing the lad, admitted him and led him to the abbot, of whom he asked permission to join the brethren of the monastery. His own father, it appears, tiring perhaps of the wretched existence of an Anglo-Saxon tenant farmer, had some time before entered the monastery as a lay brother. The Norman nobility ruled the land with an iron hand, so that there was little opportunity for a son of the Anglo-Saxon peasantry to aspire to a place in the sun.

The father abbot heard the boy's story with kindly interest, and, according to the account that has come down from Matthew Paris, replied, "Have patience, my son, and stay at school yet a while till you are better fitted for the position you desire." Apparently he had been learning his letters, in what little free time he had, at the monastery school. This, in an age of widespread illiteracy, indicates unusual ambition on the part of the boy.

But it appears that Nicholas hung about the monastery until his father, shamed doubtless by his presence, ordered him away. And so, seeing nothing before him but a life as a poor farm laborer, a beggar, or a vagabond, the boy one night gathered his few belongings, wrapped them, we may suppose, in an old handkerchief, and started out along the high road to London. But in London, too, all the avenues to advancement were controlled by the ruling Normans; so Nicholas decided to shake the dust of England from his feet and try his fortunes abroad.

Thus began one of the strangest careers in the Middle Ages. Forty years later the Norman King of England, Henry II, was to meet in Italy this former humble subject of the English Crown and to greet him as his spiritual father and fellow-sovereign. For the poor Saxon boy who had trudged along the road to St. Albans and thence to London in those far-away days was now Pope Adrian IV, Sovereign Pontiff of the Universal Church and King of the Papal States.

How had Nicholas Breakspeare come to be where he was? Unfortunately, the records of his rise in the Church are all too scanty and sometimes even contradictory. Our chief authorities are Cardinal Boso and John of Salisbury, two English contemporaries and friends of Pope Adrian. Boso was appointed chamberlain to the Pope and was in especially intimate relations with him. Tradition has it that he was the Pope's nephew, but this cannot be confirmed.

According to Boso, Breakspeare upon leaving England made his way first to Arles, in France, where he continued his studies. During a vacation he went on a visit to the monastery of St. Rufus, near Avignon, about fifty miles south of Lyons, where he found the surroundings so congenial that he joined the brethren of the Cistercian Order there and was made a canon. In 1137 he became abbot.

As abbot of St. Rufus, important business for the monastery took him to Rome. He must have been of a pleasing personality and easily recognized ability; for the reigning Pope, Eugenius III, kept him in Rome and in 1146 created him Cardinal and Bishop of Albano, one of the suffragan sees of Rome.

William of Newburgh is authority for the statement that the strictness of Breakspeare's rule as abbot of St. Rufus had resulted in defamatory charges being preferred against him to the Pope by the canons of the abbey, and that it was to exonerate himself that he went to Rome. This statement, however, is not supported by Boso, nor does it harmonize with Nicholas' own words to John of Salisbury after he had become Pope:

"The office of Pope, he assured me, was a thorny one, beset on all sides with sharp pricks. He wished, indeed, that he had never left England, his native land, or at least had lived his life quietly in the cloister of St. Rufus rather than have entered on such difficult paths, but he dared not refuse, since it was the Lord's bidding."

Cardinal Breakspeare rose rapidly to prominence in the councils of the Church. In 1152, we find him entrusted with a mission to Scandinavia as Papal Legate. In Norway he reorganized the Church, establishing the archiepiscopal see at Trondhjem, where stood the shrine of St. Olaf, the patron saint of Norway. He is credited also with having reformed the civil institutions of the country. According to Snorro, Cardinal Breakspeare earned greater popular honor and deference in Norway than any other foreigner who had ever visited the country. He also did important work in Sweden, uniting that country in closer bonds with the Papacy.

On Breakspeare's return to Rome from his successful mission in the North, he was acclaimed with great applause. The reigning Pope, Anastasius IV, dying soon thereafter, Breakspeare on the very next day was unanimously elected to the vacant throne. The date was December 3, 1154. He took the name Adrian IV.

Adrian's reign of not quite five years was destined to be one of the most turbulent in the history of the Papacy. We may well believe that at times he wished that he had never set foot in Rome. The Pope at this time was a full-fledged temporal sovereign, ruling large sections of Italy. The political conditions in that country, when he assumed the tiara, were bordering on anarchy. The local barons were engaged in warfare among themselves as well as with

the Pope, and travel on the highways was at the mercy of their depredations. Rome itself was in revolt under the leadership of the brilliant Arnold of Brescia. For a time, the Pope had to flee from Rome. Finally, he placed the city under interdict. This had the desired effect. Arnold escaped into the country but later fell into the hands of the government, and, in accordance with the harsh customs of those days, was burned at the stake.

Hardly had these difficulties been surmounted when Adrian found himself at odds with the Emperor, the renowned Frederick Barbarossa, who was coming to Italy for his coronation as head of the Holy Roman Empire. Adrian went out to meet him at Sutri, some thirty miles north of Rome. On June 9, 1155, the Pope and the Emperor met. The Pope, on horseback, expected the Emperor to hold his stirrup while he dismounted, but the Emperor refused the act of homage. Adrian quietly dismounted and, in a conference with Frederick, insisted that before he could have further dealings with him, the required homage must be performed. The Emperor finally yielding the point, another meeting was arranged two days later. Frederick on foot came to meet the Pope on horseback, and meekly held his stirrup. Then the Pope agreed to crown him as Emperor, the coronation taking place shortly afterwards in St. Peter's.

While the coronation services were going on, Frederick's troops encamped in the city were attacked by the Roman republican faction. After a long day of fighting, the latter were defeated, with losses of 1,000 killed or drowned in the Tiber and 200 prisoners. The Romans, however, managed to hold the city; so the Emperor decided to withdraw. Bidding farewell to the Pope at Tivoli, he turned northward, burning Spoleto on his way.

Adrian's next troubles were with the Norman king of Sicily, William I, who had ascended the throne in February of the year in which Adrian became Pope. Open warfare followed Adrian's refusal to recognize William's kingship. William, at the head of his troops, ravaged the Italian country, whereupon Adrian excommunicated him. The Pope himself took the field with his forces. It was during this troubled period that John of Salisbury visited him at Beneventum in the summer of 1156 and spent three months with his fellow-countryman.

King William seems to have got the better of the struggle; in

June, 1156, the Pope had to agree to peace. He confirmed the king in the possession of large territories, while the king on his part took the oath of allegiance to the Pope, with the promise of an annual tribute and the defense of the papal lands.

Adrian then made peace with the turbulent Roman populace, and early in 1157 returned to the Imperial City. But his recognition of William's pretensions greatly angered the Emperor Frederick, with whom the Pope soon found himself in open hostilities. Adrian formed a league with the Lombards against the Emperor and once more entered into the midst of a campaign. He was about to issue an edict of excommunication against the Emperor—always a convenient weapon against an enemy whom a mediaeval Pope could not thrash in a stand-up fight—when his troubles were ended by his own sudden death, of quinsy, at Anagni, on September 1, 1159.

His reign had been filled with bitterness and anxiety, foes encompassing him on all sides. Even his cardinals divided themselves into two factions on great questions of policy. As Adrian himself expressed it, "the Lord had kept him continually between the hammer and the anvil," and it was said that "the solitariness of his supreme position and unique office was increased and made more dreary by the isolation which he, as an Englishman, felt among Italians." The visit of his personal friend, John of Salisbury, doubtless cheered him much. Another of the pleasant incidents of his career was a visit from Henry II, king of his native England.

Although a number of modern authorities have cast doubt upon the affair of the donation of Ireland by Adrian, the genuineness of it appears to be established beyond dispute. It is conceded by the official *Catholic Encyclopaedia*. The deal seems to have been engineered by John of Salisbury, apparently on his own initiative, during his lengthy stay with the Pope in 1156. The transaction would have been advantageous to the Papacy by making the king of England an acknowledged vassal of the Pope; for on the church in England the royal hand lay heavy.

Most of the contention has centered round the authenticity of the papal bull, "Laudabiliter," but explicit confirmation of the incident is found in the statement of John of Salisbury in a work entitled *Metalogicus*, in which, speaking of Adrian IV, he says:

"At my solicitation he gave and granted Hibernia to Henry II, the illustrious King of England, to hold by hereditary right as his

letter to this day testifies. For all islands of ancient right, according to the Donation of Constantine, are said to belong to the Roman Church, which he founded. He sent also by me a ring of gold, with the best of emeralds set therein, wherewith the investiture might be made for his governorship of Ireland, and that same ring was ordered to be and is still in the public treasury of the King."

As this work was composed in 1159 or 1160, and the earliest existing manuscript of it dates from the period 1175-1200, the genuineness of this testimony, supported as it is by other evidence, seems practically iron-clad. Moreover, the donation was officially confirmed by Adrian's successor, Alexander III, about the year 1159, and again by letters dated September 20, 1172, although the charge of forgery has been raised in connection with these letters. At any rate, the transaction was recognized by the official acts of many succeeding Popes.

Because of the disturbed political conditions at home, Henry II did not undertake to extend his authority into Ireland until 1171, long after the death of Adrian. It is argued by some historians that Henry II never actually accepted the Pope's offer, as he did not wish to acknowledge the overlordship of the papacy, and that when he finally did invade Ireland it was for the purpose of establishing a claim by blunt "right of conquest."

The legal justification for the donation of Ireland was based on the theory of the Pope's sovereignty of all islands: that Ireland had fallen into a state of disorder, and that the king of England would, as the vassal of the Pope, restore peace, order, and security.

For the next four hundred years, the kings of England styled themselves Lords of Ireland; then, in the Reformation period, Ireland was brought directly under the British Crown. The Irish themselves acknowledged the legality of Adrian's donation, as late as 1467, when the Irish Parliament in one of its acts decreed that

"as our Holy Father Adrian, Pope of Rome, was possessed of all sovereignty of Ireland in his demesne as of fee in the right of his Church of Rome, and with the intent that vice should be subdued had alienated said land to the King of England . . . by which grant the said subjects of Ireland owe their allegiance to the King of England as their sovereign lord . . . all archbishops and bishops shall excommunicate all disobedient Irish subjects, and if they neglect to do so shall forfeit 100 pounds."

Strangely enough, it does not appear that the papacy ever formally rescinded Adrian's donation of Ireland, even after England severed relations with Rome. But that, perhaps, is no more strange than that the kings and queens of England have continued to bear the title, "Defender of the Faith," conferred by the Pope upon Henry VIII, for that royal theologian's zealous literary assaults on Protestantism.

THE USE OF THE WORD JEN IN THE CONFUCIAN ANALECTS

BY HUANG K'UEI YUEN AND J. K. SHRYOCK

THE problem connected with the use of Jen in the Analects is altogether different from that involved in the use of Tao. Compared with most of the other important words in Chinese thought, Jen is easy to translate. There is nothing mystical about it, and all writers use it in approximately the same sense.

The Hsueh Wen says that Jen is composed of two characters, Jen, or man, and Erh, or Two. Chinese commentators agree that Erh has the significance of Lin, or neighbor. In other words, the whole character is concerned with the relations between a man, and the other men with whom he comes in contact. This relation is defined by the Hsueh Wen as Ch'in. The word Ch'in as a noun means relatives or family, but here it seems to be a verb, meaning "to treat as a relative." The word, then, not only stands for a man's relations or attitude toward others, but also signifies what that attitude ought to be. One should treat all men as if they were members of his own family, that is, he should love them. In this sense it has become the chief Confucian virtue. Ch'en Hsuan, a scholar of the 18th Century, explains Jen as "to love others equally."

In the Analects, Jen is used as an adjective and as a noun. The usual verb is Ai, to love, but the two are equated. Jen, unlike the English word love, applies only to the virtue of benevolence, and not to the affection between the sexes, but Ai is used in both senses. Confucius sometimes uses Jen in such a sweeping way as to include in it all the virtues, and so Legge and other translators occasionally translate it by virtue, but the fundamental meaning of the word is love, or benevolence. Chu Hsi points out that love does include all the virtues.

The *Tsu Yuen*, a modern source book of words and phrases, gives three uses of the word.

1—It is the principle that makes man man, the essence of humanity. To love men unselfishly is Jen.

2—A kernel.

3—A negative use. When a man is unable to use his limbs, his body is not Jen.

These last two uses need not be considered. The *Tsu Yuen* also gives thirty common phrases in which Jen occurs.

In the *Analects* the word is used 109 times. It is the central word of Confucian ethics, the keystone of the arch. This is in direct opposition to the Taoists, who belittle the virtues in general and Jen in particular, Chuang Tzu even going so far as to say that to love men is the way to injure them. Jen really comes into its own in the *Analects*, so much so that an American writer has recently said that in Jen, Confucius introduced a new concept into Chinese thought. This is hardly accurate, for the word occurs eight times in the *Tao Teh Ching*, as well as in earlier classics, but its use before Confucius is not so frequent, nor so important.

When used as an adjective, the word is translated as good, benevolent or virtuous.

"The Jen man first considers. . . ." (6, 20).

"The Master said, 'Yu is not Jen. . . .'" (17, 21, 6). This was because Yu did not have the right attitude toward his parents.

"The Jen man will not seek to live by injuring Jen." (15, 8). Here the meaning could be freely rendered by, "The benevolent man would rather die than do anything unkind." The word is used both as a noun and as an adjective in the same sentence.

The interesting point in the way that Confucius uses Jen is this. He very seldom speaks about it without being asked, and when he uses it unasked, he says very little about it except that it is a fine thing. The last quotation is a good example. To say that a Jen man would rather die than injure Jen really does not tell much about what Jen is. Jen is used so often in the *Analects*, and is so important in the history of Confucian doctrine, that western scholars have paid little attention to the evident reluctance of Confucius to define exactly what he meant by the word. This reluctance was brought out even more clearly when he was forced to speak on the subject. Evidently the definition of Jen was a matter of vital importance to the disciples. Again and again they questioned Con-

fucius about it. Confucius was too honest to avoid the question, but usually, instead of attempting a clear cut definition, he applied the word to the needs of the one who had inquired. The result was that each time he was asked about Jen, he gave a different answer.

Fan Ch'ih asked concerning Jen. He asked three times, and received the following answers.

"The Jen man first considers the difficulty of his task, and afterwards thinks of acquisition." (6, 20).

"The Master said, 'It is to love men.'" (12, 22). The subject of this sentence is Jen, while the predicate is Ai.

"To be grave at home, reverent in business, and loyal to men." (13, 19, 1).

Of these replies, only the second gives much satisfaction to one seeking a definition.

Yen Hui asked concerning Jen.

"The Master said, 'To subdue oneself, and restore propriety.'" (12, 1, 1).

Yen Hui was persistent and asked what the steps in this process were. He was told not to look, listen, speak nor act except according to Li, which may be inadequately translated as propriety.

Chung Kung asked concerning Jen, and was told:

"When abroad, (to behave) as if receiving a guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice: that which you do not wish for yourself, do not give to (other) men." This last is the Confucian version of the Golden Rule, which in the Chinese is positive as well as negative. (12, 2).

Szu-ma Niu asked concerning Jen.

"Jen is to be slow and cautious in speech." (12, 13, 1). It is explained that this is because the Jen man realizes the difficulty of acting correctly.

Tzu Chang asked concerning Jen. The form of the reply is, "Confucius said," instead of the usual "the Master said," which may indicate a different source for this section. The answer was:

"To be able to practice five things everywhere." (17, 6) These five are humility, generosity, sincerity, earnestness and kindness.

Tzu Kung asked, "If a man confers benefits on the people and is able to assist all, is this Jen?" (6, 28, 1).

"The Master said, 'Why speak of Jen only? Such a man would be a sage. The Jen man, wishing to establish himself, establishes

others; wishing to enlarge himself, enlarges others; to judge by what is near; this is the art of Jen."

In this quotation, Jen appears to be only a part of perfect virtue, or holiness, but this point depends upon whether the character Hu, which ends the first sentence, is to be interpreted as a sign of interrogation, or of exclamation. The passage is difficult to put into English, especially the words translated "establish" and "enlarge."

These passages show that Jen was a subject of intense interest to the disciples, mostly young men of noble families who came to Confucius for instruction in politics and ethics. They belonged to a class which considered the government of the country as their profession, and they regarded their instruction from the sage as a very practical preparation for an official career. Yen Hui was thirty-one when he died, and Tseng Tzu was twenty-six at the time of Confucius' death. No higher tribute could be paid to the best Chinese society of the time than that it regarded the kind of instruction which Confucius gave as the proper preparation for a life of government service.

The passages also show how Confucius varied his answers to the man he addressed, and the theory is advanced in this paper that they also indicate his reluctance to speak on the subject of Jen, or to give a definition of his position. On occasions where he does not appear to have been questioned, his remarks contribute little to an understanding of the word.

"I have not seen a person who loved Jen. . . . He who loved Jen, would value nothing above it." (4, 6, 1). He goes on to say that one always has the strength to be Jen, and then qualifies this by saying that if there were an instance where Jen was unattainable, he had never seen it.

"The Master said, 'Where Jen is involved, a man must not yield even to his teacher.'" (15, 35).

"The Master said, 'Firmness, endurance, simplicity and modesty, are near to Jen.'" (13, 27).

"Even if an ideal ruler arose, it would require a generation for Jen to prevail." (13, 12).

While these are valuable statements, they do not help much in determining what Confucius' idea of Jen was. Neither does the remark of Tseng Tzu, (8, 7, 2), that Jen is the life-long responsibility of the scholar.

The difficulty is, that here is what seems to be a relatively simple

word, yet it is necessary for the disciples to question Confucius about it over and over again, and except in one passage, they find it impossible to get a clear answer. That Confucius was really reticent on the subject is apparent from the following passage.

"The Master seldom spoke of profit, of the Decree, and of Jen." (9, 1).

This raises a serious problem, especially for those who have translated Jen by virtue. The word occurs in the Analects, which is a short book, 109 times. To say that Confucius seldom spoke of virtue is absurd, for he seldom spoke of anything else. Soothill and Legge translate the word here by "perfect virtue," meaning, probably, that he would not admit anyone to have been perfect. That he did not accept anyone to have completely realized Jen is true, but that is not what this passage says. It maintains that Confucius seldom discussed the word which is used in the book of his collected sayings 109 times. Soothill ignores the problem in his notes, but Legge is frank enough to admit that there is a problem, and that he does not know how to solve it. Why should Confucius be said to have seldom discussed the very word for which he is famous, the key to the system which goes by his name, especially when that word appears on nearly half the pages of the book which records his conversation?

There is only one explanation which is at all adequate. It is that Confucius was really reluctant to speak on the subject, but that he was forced to do so by his disciples. At the time he was teaching, the word must have been under constant discussion among the class of men from whom Confucius drew his pupils, but probably the exact meaning had not been determined, or a new content was being given it in a period of change and ferment. Lao Tze and Confucius were the leaders, but there must have been many men who were discussing and analysing the same problems with which they dealt. It was a time of intense intellectual activity and stimulus, and the content of the word Jen was of vital importance. Confucius realized the difficulty as well as the importance, and therefore he avoided the subject unless he was forced to consider it. The disciples rendered a great service by compelling him to discuss it, for in his answers he reached some of the highest points ever attained by the human mind.

The analysis of the character shows that it stands for the relation of a man to his neighbors. It is not unreasonable, then, for us

to interpret the question which the disciples asked so often in this way.

“What is my duty toward my neighbor?”

That question was discussed several hundred years later in Palestine. There also the Master refused to give a definition as an answer, replying by a story.

“Who is my neighbor?”

“A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho. . . .”

Confucius gave answers which show that his view was strikingly like that of Christ. He applied the word to the man. For one, it meant devotion to his parents, for another, to be slow in speech, for a third, to gain self-control, for a fourth, to behave according to the recognized rules of society. Love, then, is a principle which each man must apply for himself. It is an attitude rather than a rule of conduct, and that is probably why Confucius was so reluctant to discuss it. His disciples, like the Jews, wanted hard and fast rules, such as to give a tenth of one's income to charity. Confucius, like Christ, tried to avoid saying anything that could be crystallized into such a rule. His answers show that he considered love to include all the virtues, even self-respect and self-control; that it was not sentimental, for it must be firm and just; that it did not obliterate the distinctions of society, for it included the proper treatment of parents and the recognition of moral obligations and customs. And above all, Jen was universal, since it meant to love all men. A man should love his neighbor as himself, or as Confucius put it, what he did not wish for himself, he should not give to others. It is not surprising that the ethical teaching of the Chinese should center about the word Jen, or that Confucius should be eulogized as “The teacher of 10,000 generations.”

THE DEVIL, THE WORLD AND THE FLESH

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

(Concluded)

MUSIC, DANCE AND DRAMA OF INFERNAL ORIGIN

THE Devil has been popularly credited with the invention of music. Victor Hugo repeatedly refers in his works to the popular belief in the diabolical origin of music. Asmodeus himself, in LeSage's novel, *le Diable boiteux* (1707), asserts that he is the inventor of music. This popular belief is based on Church tradition, which ascribed the origin of music, not without good reason, to the Devil. Catholic asceticism denounced all instrumental music as the Devil's work. Even some Protestant sects not many decades ago condemned music during religious services as a Satanic artifice to lure men's thoughts away from God. The popular English preacher, Rowland Hill, long ago admitted the fact that the Devil had all the good melodies, and a popular hymn-writer of this country likewise thought it unfortunate that Diabolus should have all the good tunes.

This view is shared by many modern writers who can hardly be said to believe in Beelzebub. James Huneker, in his already quoted *Bedouins*, speaking of the Devil, affirms, "Without him . . . there would be . . . no music . . . He created the chromatic scale—that is why Richard Wagner admired the Devil in music—what is *Parsifal*," the great American art critic concludes his pæan of praise of the Prince of Pleasure, "but a version of the Black Mass?" Dr. Henry van Dyke, in a statement dated February 27, 1921, credits the Demon with the invention at least of jazz-music. The songs of a musical comedy are considered by our high-brow critics "the Devil's own ditties."

The Devil always has given sufficient proof of his musical talent. Again James Huneker, in his *Bedouins* just quoted again, goes so far as to call Satan "the greatest of all musicians." The vocal ability of the demons of hell was early discovered by the medieval

monks. Thomas de Cantimpré, writing in the thirteenth century, tells how a demon composed a famous song about St. Martin and circulated it abroad all over France and Germany. In the second, more sketchy, part of Novalis' *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* (1802), the Principle of Good and the Principle of Evil appear in open competition, singing antiphonies. The French composer, Boieldieu, believed that he had composed the "Valse infernale" for his comic opera *Faust* (1828) with the help of the Devil in person.

But Satan's greatest musical work is perhaps the *Sonata del Diavolo* (1713) nominally composed by Giuseppe Tartini, an Italian musician. According to Tartini's own testimony, the Devil appeared to him in his dream and played on his violin an air of such great beauty that the composer, upon awakening, seized his own instrument and played "The Devil's Trill."

Diabolus is also credited with a sonata by Gérard de Nerval in *la Sonate du Diable* (1830). This story tells how a musician, chagrined that his daughter understood nothing of music, offered her hand to the man who could write and execute the best sonata, "be it the Devil in person." The Evil Spirit, who is never slow to appear when called, arrived with two accompanists at the musical tournament, which the master had arranged. The Devil, it transpired, had written the best sonata of all the aspirants to the hand of the maiden. But an angel, wishing to checkmate the Devil, on the evening preceding the day fixed for the tournament, handed a sonata to the young man who was in love with the musician's daughter. But even the angelic sonata was inferior to that of the infernal composer. However, when the Devil's players approached the end of their superb composition, convinced of their final victory, the young man surreptitiously substituted his own parchment for theirs and thus won out in the end.¹¹

While the Devil plays all instruments equally well, he seems to prefer the violin. He was said in the Middle Ages to own a violin with which he could set whole cities, grandparents and grandchildren, men and women, girls and boys, to dancing, dancing, until they fell dead from sheer exhaustion. The Devil appears in this rôle in the medieval legend of the Pied Piper, which is well known to English readers through Robert Browning's poem, "The Pied Piper of Hamelin" (1843), Robert Buchanan's opera, *The Piper of*

¹¹ Mr. W. H. Snyder has written, in 1911, a drama in three acts entitled *The Devil's Sonata*.

Hamelin (1893), and Miss Josephine Peabody's play, *The Piper* (1909). The miraculous musician in this legend carried off one hundred and fifty children when the inhabitants of Hammel in Saxony refused to pay him for ridding them of the rats, which had infested their town. This Pied Piper was, according to Johannes Wierus and Robert Burton, none other than the Devil in person. The rats were the human souls, which the Devil charmed by his music into following him. In the Middle Ages, the soul was often represented leaving the body in the form of a mouse. The soul of a good person, it was believed, comes out of the mouth as a white mouse, while, at the death of a sinner, the soul escapes as a black mouse, which the Devil catches and carries off in his sack to hell. Mephistopheles, it will be remembered, calls himself, in Goethe's *Faust*, "the Lord of rats and mice" (i. 1516). Death, the Devil's first cousin, if not his *alter ego*, similarly is represented, in the Dance of Death, marching off the souls to hell to the accompaniment of a merry tune on his violin.

Satan appears as a fiddler in the poem "*Der Teufel mit der Geige*," which has been attributed to the Swiss anti-Papist, Pamphilus Gengenbach, of the sixteenth century. Klemens Brentano, in the fragmentary *Romanzen vom Rosenkranz* (written in 1909 and published posthumously in 1852), represents the Devil playing the violin, sending forth from this instrument shockingly shrill tunes. In Lenau's *Faust* (1836), Mephistopheles takes the violin out of the hands of one of the musicians at a peasant-wedding and plays on it a diabolical *czardas*, which fills with voluptuousness the hearts of all who hear it. An opera *Un Violon du Diable* was played in Paris in 1849, and Benjamin Webster's extravaganza in verse, "*The Devil's Violin*," was performed the same year in London. The Devil also appears as a limping fiddler in a California legend, which appeared, in 1855, in the *Pioneer*, a Californian magazine, under the title "The Devil's Fiddle." In his story "les Tentations ou Éros, Plutus et la Gloire" (1863), Charles Baudelaire presents the Demon of Love holding in his left hand a violin, "which, without doubt, served to sing his pleasures and pains." We also meet the diabolical musician in "The Devil in a Nunnery," a medieval legend modernized by Francis Oskar Mamm (1914). In this story, the Devil, disguised as a pilgrim, enters a convent, and plays on his "cithern" for the entertainment of the nuns. Slyly he

drifts into the most voluptuous music, until the nuns are overcome with old memories that should be dead. The effect is so disastrous to their serenity that in expiation a fast is ordered for the next day.¹²

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Naturally the Devil is also the originator of the dance, particularly the rapid and fantastic variety. Asmodeus, in Le Sage's previously mentioned novel, assumes credit for the invention of the dance.¹³

The demons inherited their dancing ability from the ærial spirits, who were too ethereal in nature to walk prosaically on earth. For this reason, dancing is their distinguishing characteristic. In many legends, the Devil becomes the dancing partner of the girls who show too great a fondness for dancing, and who, therefore, must dance with their diabolical partner without rest or repose till they fall dead. Friedrich Hebbel has used this legend in his poem "Der Tanz" (1832). In this romance, based on an Eiderstedt legend, a young girl is seized by such transports of joy in dancing at a ball that she keeps whirling about after all the others have left the hall. When her mother warns her that she is fatiguing herself and asks her to stop dancing and go home, the girl boastfully replies that even if the Devil himself were present, he could not tire her out. But no sooner has she uttered these words when a young man in dark clothes approaches her and invites her to dance with him. The girl accepts the invitation, and the pair swing around in the empty hall. But now the girl finds no joy in her dancing; she feels rather as if she stood on the edge of her grave. The mother enters the hall and again asks her daughter to stop dancing. But the young girl cannot break away from the grasp of the weird looking youth, who holds her so firmly in his

¹² In this connection it may be interesting to refer to the following Irish tale mentioned by Leland in a footnote to his translation of Heine's *Elementar-geister*: Pat O'Flanagan, the tailor, was dancing in mad joy with the Devil, who was fiddling, while both took alternate sups from Satan's whisky-bottle. "Whin, och what a pity! all at wanst this foine parrety was broken up by the apparence of Judy, Pat's wife." In the end, the Devil goes off with Mrs. O'Flanagan.

¹³ It is believed that our waltz originated in a dance called *la Volta* performed at the mediæval Witches' Sabbath. See Margaret Alice Murray's *The Witch-Cult in Western Europe* (Oxford, 1921), pp. 134-5.

arms. Suddenly blood spurts out of her mouth; and as she sinks dead to the ground, the diabolical young man disappears in the fog and the night.

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In addition to his sponsorship of the dance, the Devil is likewise regarded as the inventor of the drama. Asmodeus, who figures in the novel by LeSage, contends that he is the creator of comedy. Certainly the Church condemned all secular dramatic performances as "*pompæ diaboli*." The Church fathers declared that all dramatic arts emanated from the Devil (Pseudo-Cyprian: *De Spectaculis*, iv; Tatian: *Oratio ad Græcos*, xxii). St. John Chrysostom also denounced the "Satanic corruptions of the stage." Indeed, the actors were regarded by the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, and even for many centuries afterwards, as servants of Satan and denied the holy sacraments and burial in consecrated ground. It is a matter of common knowledge that Molière, the creator of the French comedy, who died in 1673, was considered unfit for Christian burial. In revenge, the condemned comedians starred Satan in their plays. Protestants were likewise opposed to play-production. During the sixteenth century, the faithful were forbidden by the Church of England to attend plays of any kind, and any person connected with the stage was denied the offices of the church.

The Puritans considered the play-house the Devil's own place. Stephen Gosson, in his *School of Abuse* (1579), affirmed seriously of theatrical productions: "There is more in them than we perceive; the Devil stands at our elbow when we see not, speaks when we hear not, strikes when we feel not, and wounds sore when he raises no skin, nor rents the flesh." Archbishop John Sharp of London (1645-1714) said that going to the theater was equivalent to looking at the Devil. Our own George Jean Nathan, who certainly cannot be suspected of orthodoxy, fancifully terms the theater "the house of Satan" in his book by that title (1926). A story is told of the demon who entered a woman in the theater and, when exorcised, excused himself by saying that he had found her in his own "demesne."¹⁴

¹⁴ See Thornton S. Graves, "The Devil in the Playhouse," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XIX (1920), 131-40.

LUCIFER AS LITTÉRATEUR

The Devil was also regarded by our ancestors as the patron of publications. The assertion that his Satanic Majesty hates nothing so much as writing or printer's ink is surely a calumny. In Samuel Crothers' essay, "The Merry Devil of Education" (1910), Diabolus declares, "Ink is my native element." The German mystic, Jacob Böhme, relates that when Satan was asked the cause of God's enmity toward the Adversary and of the latter's subsequent downfall, he replied, "I wished to be an author."¹⁵ The punishment meted out to Satan for his diabolical genius has evidently not cured him of his literary aspirations.

The Devil is recognized as a great writer, although he may never have received any royalties on work published over his own signature.¹⁶ Having been denied copyright privileges on earth, and probably also lacking asbestos paper, Diabolus must perforce publish over human signatures. He finds it, moreover, to his advantage to dictate his ideas through the pens of mortals in order to carry on his work better on earth.

It may be said without exaggeration that all writers, consciously or unconsciously, owe their inspiration to the Devil. Gæthe remarked jokingly on the tenth of January, 1789, that he would have to sell his soul to Satan in order to write his *Faust*. But it is not necessary to enter formally a bond with Beelzebub in order to obtain his aid in writing a book. The Devil is always near to them who are engaged in the profession of letters. It is not without good reason, therefore, that the priests maintain that "the writers are all more or less demons" (Victor Hugo: *les Quatre cents de l'esprit*, 1882, and *Toute la lyre*, 1888-93).

It is a well-known fact that books have in all times been considered tools of hell. For the things that men write have their influence in formulating the ideas and ideals of the reader, and to this extent authors stand in the service of Satan. Thomas Carlyle also believed that he served Satan, but his only regret was that he received no reward for his services. "Sad fate!" he exclaimed, "to serve the Devil and yet get no wages even from him."

¹⁵ The word "author" is used in this connection in its current meaning.

¹⁶ In this connection it is interesting to note that Diabolus has been credited with the authorship of the biggest Bible in the world—the *gigas librorum*—which is found in the Royal Library at Stockholm and which is therefore called the Devil's Bible.

It is especially the imaginative works of literature which are generally considered to be of infernal inspiration. When Asmodeus, in LeSage's noteworthy novel, maintains that he is the inventor of all things that make for beauty in this world, he might just as well have said that he was also the creator of literature. If, from modesty, he did not personally make this assertion, others affirmed it for him. It stands to reason that whatever we read for our enjoyment is in the eyes of Catholic asceticism of infernal origin.

But apart from its joy-giving quality, what we call *belles lettres* is decidedly diabolical in its essence. The writers themselves admit the infernal origin of their work. "I have heard all the men of letters say that their profession was diabolical," asserts Eugène Delacroix. The demonic element is most essential for the success of great creative literary works other than treatises of a scientific or historic nature. The fire and originality in many a masterpiece is due to that power which Timolean calls *Automatia* and Goethe, in his conversation with Eckermann in 1828, *das Dämonische*—the dæmonic—"that which cannot be explained by reason or understanding, which is not in our nature, but to which we are subject."¹⁷ Voltaire believed that, to be a successful author, it was necessary to have *le diable au corps*. In full agreement with the dictum of the patriarch of Ferney, Gottfried Keller, the Swiss novelist, has this to say in regard to literary success:

"He who has had no bitter experience knows no malice; and he who has known no malice has not the Devil in him; and he who has not the Devil in him cannot write anything that will have force and vigor."

Fiction figures in the eyes of many men as a fabrication of the Fiend. Many indictments may indeed be drawn up against all forms of fiction. On account of its frequently immoral matter, the novel has received the condemnation of many a moralist. "The personages of fiction," the great Toystoy declares, "have souls; and it is but truth to say that their malignant authors send them forth among us like demons to tempt us and to ruin us." According to the famous Russian author, Balzac, the Titan of the French novel, is the Lucifer of literature. But the creator of the *Comédie hu-*

¹⁷ Goethe undoubtedly used the word "demonic" as a synonym for "supernatural" with a complimentary connotation. But a writer may be inspired by a good or an evil spirit according as to whether the gravitation of his imagination is toward heaven or hell.

maine is not the only French novelist who has been under anathema. It has been said that all French novelists are of the Devil's party. Nor, for that matter, will the romancers of other countries take their places among the elect of heaven.

Many a well-known novelist, in other countries as well as in France, has produced his work *coopérante Diabolo*. The Fiend has always shown partiality in aiding fictionists. The German fantastic writer, E. T. A. Hoffmann, held the opinion that the Devil was "an ever helpful aid-de-camp of story-tellers in need of help." Tradition has it that the demons of hell guided the pen of many a fiction writer. Asmodeus, for example, wishing to take vengeance on the monks, his sworn enemies, whispered the *Decameron* (c. 1350) into the ears of Boccaccio, while Beelzebub avenged himself on the devil-fighting knights of the Middle Ages by inspiring Cervantes with *Don Quixote* (1605-16).

As for poetry, no argument is needed to show that this emotional art is an expression of the powers of darkness. The poetry of passion in particular is poison. All lyricists are the Levites of Lucifer. Moreover, poetry is often used to sing the praises of the Prince of this world. Byron, the poet of doubt and despair, is not the only "chanter of hell," as Lamartine called him. Even Milton, the great Puritan poet, showed himself as a partisan of the powers of darkness. "The reason," said William Blake, "Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of angels and God, and at liberty when of devils and hell, is because he was a true poet, and of the Devil's party without knowing it." It cannot be denied that the personality of the Devil was the chief preoccupation of the poet. Addison and Dryden, among many other English and foreign authorities, regarded Milton's fallen archangel as the focal point of attention or the real hero of the poem. "The finest thing in connection with this [Milton's] *Paradise*," says Taine, in his *Histoire de la littérature française* (1863), "is Hell; and in this history of God the chief part is taken by the Devil." What fascinated also Chateaubriand in Milton's poem was the character of Satan, whom he considered the finest conception of all poetic personifications of Evil.^{17a}

Criticism, as all creative writers will agree, is without any doubt whatsoever the work of the Devil. "Literary criticism," says Sainte-Beuve, "the kind that I am writing, is alas! hardly com-

^{17a} On this question, see Emily Hickey's article, "Is Satan the Hero of *Paradise Lost*?" *Catholic World*, XCVI (1912), 5871.

patible with Christian practice . . ." The literary critic may wish to be fair, but not infrequently the animus of professional rivalry or scorn seizes him, and he plays the rôle of the Spirit of negation and destruction. The critic of books and their authors, considered in this light, is nothing if not a Devil's advocate. On the other hand, the writers with whom the critic differs are identified by him, in one way or another, with the person of the Devil.

But not only literary works enjoyed the distinction of being considered of diabolical inspiration. In Catholic eyes, the majority of books produced by men owed their origin to the unholy devices and corruptions of Satan. It is a well-known fact that, in the good old days, every book printed without the approval of the Church was associated with the demons of hell.¹⁸

THE DEVIL AS RADICAL AND REFORMER

The Devil was popularly regarded as a pioneer of progress. He was hailed as the standard-bearer of the great reformers and innovators of all ages. Satan was credited with all aspirations for improvement in every field of human activity. The Church contended that it was Satan who inspired the opposition against priestcraft and kingcraft, and that it was the Devil who filled man with the love of liberty, equality and fraternity. Diabolus represented discontent with existing conditions in matters social, political, and ecclesiastical. He was identified with the spirit of progress so disturbing to those who are satisfied with the existing order of things. Every democratic institution, every social reform, was attributed by the reactionaries to the machinations of the spirits of hell.¹⁹

The French Revolution was regarded by the Catholic Church as a creation of the Evil Spirit.²⁰ It was asserted by Catholicism that France was possessed of the Devil during the revolutionary period. According to Victor Hugo, the Catholics believed that the members of the Convention were carried off at their death by the Devil (*les Misérables* I. i. 10). This great French poet himself,

¹⁸ In this connection it may be well to refer the reader to the story, "The Printer's Devil," published anonymously in 1836 and reprinted in the present writer's anthology of *Devil Stories* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1931).

¹⁹ Soviet Russia, on account of her experimentation in social and political reforms, is envisaged at the present day by two writers as the "Devil's workshop."

²⁰ The Catholic view of the French Revolution down to the present day may be seen in *le Diable et la Révolution* (1895), a work written by the impostor Leo Taxil and dedicated to Pope Leo XIII.

in his royalist days, described the Convention as a Pandemonium (*Odes et poésies diverses*, 1822). Marmontel had already previously said that the members of the Convention were "living bronze figures of demons."

The priests taught the French peasants that the civil Constitution promulgated by the Convention, which transferred the property of the Church from the Catholic hierarchy to the French government, was the diabolical masterpiece of this infernal Revolution. Count Joseph de Maistre, the theoretical proponent of absolutism in church and government, also considered the French Revolution the work of Satan (*Considérations sur la France*, 1796). His yoke-fellow, the Viscount Joseph de Bonald, saw in Jacobinism "the reign of demons." Chateaubriand, the partisan of pontiffs and potentates, shared this Catholic view with regard to the French Revolution. In *les Martyrs* (1809), he went so far as to put the revolutionary hymn of his country into the mouth of the Devil.

The revolutionaries, no less than the reactionaries, regarded the French Revolution as the work of Satan. The difference in the conception of this great historical event by the two parties is that the monarchists considered the revolt against the God-ordained powers as a sin, whereas the republicans saw it in a different light.

Either party was absolutely correct in regarding Satan as the moving spirit of the French Revolution. For the emperian rebel is the incarnation of the spirit of revolt in men and the instigator of all social and political upheavals on earth. The Devil, waging on earth the war he started in heaven, will always be found as a partisan of those who seek to throw off the yoke of their heavenly ordained oppressors. Satan is the grandest symbol of protest against tyranny, celestial or terrestrial, that the world can conceive. "The Devil," says Anatole France, "is the father of all anarchy." Was not Satan the first of all rebels against constituted authority? Did he not first utter the words, "*Non serviam*," which burn on the lips of all revolutionaries? Satan was the symbol of the movement for the liberation of the human spirit from the bonds of absolutism,—a movement which started with the French Revolution. He was the embodiment of the revolutionary movement, which was sweeping Europe a century ago. He was the leader of the great army of Human Freedom, as Heine called the lovers of liberty of his day. It was under the standard of Satan that the oppressed

masses in all European countries fought in 1830 against the princes and potentates, who assumed to rule them by divine right. Satan stood at the head of all the agitators and conspirators against political oppression of the past century, and as predicted by the Italian poet, Rapisardi, Lucifer will also accomplish the social revolution which is now preparing in all European countries and bring a new era for mankind, in which social equity as well as political equality will be effected.

*
* * *

The Devil was represented by the theologians as the Arch-Fiend, the bitter enemy of the good and holy men. The champions of the common folk, on the other hand, saw in Satan the defender of the downtrodden, and the protector of the poor and helpless against the high and mighty of the land. The Devil, who has always been a democrat, is said to have interfered in favor of the peasants or serfs against the feudal lords. The Fiend appears in the folk-lore of all European countries as the defender of accused innocence, and as an exemplar of honesty and fidelity. Diabolus exerted his powers of retribution on misers, on men who brought no good to themselves or to others despite all their hoarded wealth. He was also represented as a chastiser of the Pecksniffs, the moral pretenders. Satan was universally regarded as the Nemesis of the publicans and ale-wives who adulterated the beer they poured out, or who gave short measure to their customers. Gratitude is the crowning quality with which man has invested the Devil of his dreams. Many medieval legends report the Devil's gratitude whenever he is treated with justice. With regard to this trait, Satan can certainly be cited in marked contrast to the sons of Adam.

THE DEVIL AS HEDONIST

Satan has always been portrayed as the Prince of Pleasure. The joys and delights of life were considered by Catholic ascetics as emanations from hell. "Laughter and gaiety," said St. John Chrysostom, "come not from God, but from the Devil (*Opera* vii. 97; x. 590). The modern diabolist, Charles Baudelaire, similarly detected the Devil in human laughter. The excitable poisons, such as tobacco, alcohol, opium, hashish, were for this French

poet "Satanic suggestions," the most terrible means employed by the Evil One to enslave humanity. They all represented for him "artificial paradises."²¹ Liquor is to our own teetotalers the Devil's invention. "King Alcohol is the Devil's worst emissary on earth," recently said a certain Methodist preacher.²²

The Church looked upon Lucifer as the lord of earthly love. The affection of one sex for another was believed, from the earliest period of the Christian era, to be under the special control of the powers of hell. Carnal love was regarded by the Christian monks and missionaries as nothing short of demoniac possession, and its enjoyment was believed to lead man to certain and eternal perdition.

The Church considered celibacy to be the only perfect state, and hesitated for a long time to give its sanction to marriage, which it regarded as unworthy of the "spiritual man." St. Paul denounced marriage in strong terms. "Celibacy must be chosen," said St. Tertullian, "even though the human race should perish." Origen denounced marriage in the following terms: "Matrimony is impure and unholy; a means of sensual passion." When, at the Council of Trent, marriage was finally included among the sacraments of the Church, it was regarded as a *remedium amoris* conceded by the kindness of God to the turpitude of the "natural man."²³

WOMAN AS INSTRUMENTUM DIABOLI

The Church fathers believed that Satan brought about the downfall of men through the allurements of women. All women were regarded as the daughters of the Devil, and all men as bewitched by these sorceresses of Satan.²⁴ St. Paul expressed his horror of women's charms. He confessed that it was only by the strongest practice of faith that he could stay in their society and remain sinless. As Satan is the eternal tempter, so is woman in

²¹ See Wilhelm Michel's essay, "Baudelaire und die Gifte," *Masken*. Bd. XXIII. Heft 21 (1930).

²² The reader will recall in this connection Captain John Silver's song—"Drink and the Devil had done for the rest."

²³ On the final inclusion of marriage among the sacraments, see G. Serrier: *le Mariage contrat-sacrement*. Paris, 1928.

²⁴ Mr. H. M. Tichenor, former editor of the *Melting Pot*, in his clever booklet, *Satan and the Saints* (1918), has described the manner in which the saints escaped the sorceries of Satan incorporated in the daughters of the earth.

the eyes of the Church the eternal instrument of temptation—*instrumentum Diaboli*, the most efficient of stalking-horses, behind which the Devil goes hunting for the immortal souls of men. St. Cyprian said, "Woman is the instrument which the Evil One employs to possess our souls," and St. Tertullian addressed the beautiful sex with the following words: "Woman, thou ought to go about clad in mourning and ashes, thine eyes filled with tears of remorse, to make us forget that thou hast been man's destruction. Woman, thou art the gate to hell." This feminine-diabolical kinship is expressed by the rabbis in their belief that both the Devil and woman entered the world simultaneously.

Many thinkers and writers seem to concur with the fathers of the Church with regard to women. The belief in woman as Satan's instrument in his work of temptation is almost universal among moderns. The German poet and playwright, Lessing, back in the eighteenth century, asserts, "The hand of a woman is often the glove in which Satan conceals his claw." Prosper Mérimée speaks fully in the spirit of the Church fathers when he says, "Woman is the surest instrument of damnation which the Evil One can employ." Woman is especially used by the Devil as a tool to lead man to ruin. This belief explains the French proverb which says, "Man is tow, woman is fire, and the Devil blows on it." Anatole France also affirms, "It is through woman that the Devil takes great advantage of man." Barbey d'Aurevilly believes that women possess greater powers of temptation even than the Devil himself. "Women," this writer says, "are all temptresses, ready to tempt God or the Devil."

Woman's natural inclination to evil is expressed by Goethe in the following lines:

"When towards the Devil's house we tread,

Woman's a thousand steps ahead." (*Faust* i. 3980-81.)

Other writers think that woman is a match for the Devil in wickedness. Schopenhauer's contempt for woman is too well known to need further comment. "Where the Devil gets through, a woman will get through, too," says Mérimée. "The Devil," this writer also expresses through the mouth of one of his characters, "has nothing left to teach women who overdress themselves and coil their hair fantastically." (We post-Victorians might say, "who underdress themselves and bob their hair fantastically.")

Kornel Makuszynski believes that woman is even more wicked than the Devil. In his *Another Paradise Lost and Regained* (1926), this Polish writer affirms that "Satan himself would not do the things a woman will do and lay to his charge."

Thus woman is believed by modern writers to be possessed of the Evil One. "Every woman," Barbey assures us, "has a devil somewhere who would always be her master, were it not for the fact that she has two others also in her—Cowardice and Shame—to interfere with the first one." This saying is fully in keeping with the proverb which affirms that "The heart of a beautiful woman is the most beloved hiding-place of at least seven devils."

Many writers go so far as to express their belief that woman is partly or wholly the Devil in person. Woman is for Diderot a combination of angel and Devil. Heine does not consider woman wholly diabolical, but he does not know at what point in her the angel ends and the Devil begins. Molière considers woman as the very Devil, and for Balzac woman is a perfected Devil.

Baudelaire regarded woman as wholly diabolical in body and spirit. As a dandy he despised woman, as a Catholic he considered her "one of the most seductive forms of the Devil" and wondered why she was admitted into churches. "Woman," again says this French poet, "is the feminine form of the Other, the most dangerous incarnation of the Evil One." Commenting on the romance *le Diable amoureux* (1772), he remarks, "The camel of Cazotte, camel, Devil, and woman." It should be remembered that Baudelaire was less attached to the form of woman as to her spirit, which he regarded as diabolical. Verlaine, following the lead of the poet Baudelaire, his master in Satanism, likewise believed in woman's identity with the Devil ("Femme et chatte," 1866). Strindberg saw in woman a living Gehenna adorned with all the allures of Satan.²⁵

For the etcher Rops, who was also a disciple of the diabolist Baudelaire, woman is the demonic incarnation of lust, the daughter of darkness, the servant of Satan, the partner of hell, the vampire who sucks the blood of the cosmos. In Barbey's tales as in Rops' etchings, we behold woman engaged in her worship of the Devil. She is described by these diabolist and decadent artists as an adept

²⁵ On the woman as an impersonation of the Devil, see also the end of the chapter "The Form of the Fiend" in the present work.

in all black arts and an expert in all forms of sexual perversion. She is portrayed wallowing in the wildest orgies of lewdness and licentiousness, continually invoking, extolling and worshipping Lucifer, the lord of lust.

Concerning love, too, the Church fathers find support among many poets and philosophers of modern times. Voltaire regarded the Devil and love as synonymous. Love, for Alfred de Vigny, was the art of the Devil and not of the Deity. This pessimistic poet, considering love as idle and mendacious, did not deny to it, however, a narcotizing value in the hands of Satan. Baudelaire always saw the Satanic side in love, and proved his thesis by the animal names we give to the woman we love. "Have not the devils the forms of beasts?" he asks. "The one and supreme bliss of love," this poet again says, "rests in the certainty of doing evil; and man and woman know from birth that in evil is found all pleasure." "Love," this diabolist again affirms, "is the most terrible of all incarnations at the service of Satan." Schopenhauer, in his essay, "Metaphysik der Geschlechtsliebe" (1859), arrived at the same conclusion, arguing that love does not exist to make us happy, but to deceive us under the cover of happiness, and to compel us to perform actions profitable to the human race, but suicidal to the individual. The conception of love as a demonic factor prevails throughout all modern literature; Ibsen, Toystoy, Ola Hanson, Przybyszewski, Prus, Hardy, and Shaw, all perceiving in eroticism not an ideal which should be pursued, but a cosmic power which makes the human being a puppet moving to some incomprehensible goal.

CONCLUSION

Thus the Devil is the representative of terrestrial interests and enjoyments, in contrast to those of the spiritual realm. As a skillful reasoner and logician, he plays havoc with those who dispute his clever materialistic philosophy, for he excels in dialectic. He stands for the glorification of the flesh in painting and sculpture, in the dance and drama, in fiction and romantic adventure, depicting forbidden pleasures in vivid colors, luring on the amorous and the yearning to supposed happiness only to dash this expectation into an empty sense of unreality and frustration. It is his restless

impulse in men which provokes them to unsettle the old order of things and become reformers in the hope of promoting greater happiness. His efforts are inspired by a lusty, democratic hedonism. The protean character of this supermalevolent Personality is attested by a mixture of beneficent traits, such as his ambition, his spirit of good fellowship and democracy, and a progressive desire to unsettle things too long established. Besides which, what would life be without the gratification of the senses? Drabness itself is a mockery of life. But to submit this important Personage to close cross-questioning by Kantian or Huxleyan dialectic is taking an unfair advantage over this mysterious mythological entity, this superhuman presence in our midst.

THE SELF

BY CHARLES EUGENE BANKS

Out of the cosmic cell I came,
Out of the voiceless deep:
Kept alive by a mystic flame,
Fighting endless sleep:
Groping upward, dumb and blind;
Trackless the way before:
Mystery shrouding all behind
Whispering "Nevermore"!

Fish and serpent, soaring bird
Sweeping the azure dome;
Lion, leopard, caveman, Kurd,
Each gave me a home.
Field or forest, man or beast,
Weapon of claw or stone,
Always slaughter on flesh to feast,
Always the sun-bleached bone.

Stark barbarian, pirate bold
Sailing the wine-dark sea:
Miner braving the Arctic cold,
These I came to be.
Always the eager endless quest,
Always the inward fire,
Always the better out of the best,
Always the heart's desire.

Urged by greed I rose to power,
I soared on eagle wings,
I fought for glory, had my hour
In company of kings ;
Then down again to dreamless dark,
Close sealed in royal tomb,
With never a stroke of time to mark
The years of my golden gloom.

I woke to Beauty ; my senses thrilled
With odors of evening cool ;
A night bird sang, the pale moon spilled
Silver in dusky pool.
Winds roared, trees moaned ; on shoreward seas
Plumed horsemen madly strove ;
Flowers blushed in the amorous breeze
And I stood at the door of Love.

Calm-eyed Justice, crimson gowned,
Miser counting his gains ;
Martyr deep in dungeon bound
Straining against his chains ;
Yoeman, Noble, Hero, Seer,
Japheth or Shem or Ham,—
All I know of the past is here,
All I have been I am.

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